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I. Summary
In February 2003, more than seventy lawyers and engineers from
the U.S. information technology, consumer electronics, and video
content industries gathered outside Washington, D.C. to begin
consideration of technologies that would ensure that embedded copy
protection signals remained persistent when information was changed
from digital to analog form. During this meeting, a Warner Bros.
representative said that the absence of rules in the analog world was
preventing natural evolution towards the broad use of digital forms of
high-quality content, even though digital was clearly a superior
technology that should "win" the evolutionary battle.1 In other words,
this individual was claiming that the existence of machines that do not
follow content industry rules is unnatural-because use of such
machines will slow natural evolution towards a well-controlled,
successful digital future. Such a use of evolutionary theory is
indicative of the industry's firmly-held belief that it has a natural right
to prevail, and that its current business models should be protected by
courts, legislators, and regulators.
As part of this believed biological imperative, the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA") and its content affiliates (broadly
referred to as the U.S. "content industry") would like all consumer
electronics and information technology companies to innovate
"according to the rules." This would ensure that Hollywood's movies
are specially protected from unauthorized redistribution inside and
outside the home through adherence to a "broadcast flag" scheme
(proposed to be implemented by the FCC) and through anticipated
legislation that will require U.S. manufacturers to follow policies
designed to ensure that protection signals are not lost in any digital-
analog-digital conversions (so that the "analog hole" is closed). The
triggering event for the broadcast flag/analog hole discussion is the
digital television ("DTV") transition, a step that is supposed to occur
by 2006. Moving to DTV will release a good deal of radio spectrum
for new uses (because the broadcasters will use only their digital
spectrum and will give back their analog spectrum), and the FCC will
auction licenses for this spectrum-with the proceeds going to the
federal government. Congress has been assuming in its budgeting
1. Author's personal notes from February 12, 2003 meeting of Analog Reconversion
Discussion Group. No reporters are permitted to attend meetings of the Analog
Reconversion Discussion Group, and there is no published record of this February 2003
meeting.
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process that revenues from the resulting spectrum will be more than
$6 billion. Thus, there is tremendous pressure to complete the DTV
transition. Hollywood is using this pressure to ensure that its rules are
adopted, saying that unless their high-quality content is adequately
protected it will not be broadcast, and that no one will want to watch
low-value broadcast content. Because the DTV transition is
dependent on consumers buying new digital televisions, and
presumably consumers who do not want to watch low-value content
will buy new machines, Hollywood's threat has facial appeal to
regulators.
While it is beyond question that the digital world poses special
threats to businesses that live or die on their ability to control the
distribution of content, the arguments made by the MPAA and its
content colleagues in support of national (and, eventually, global)
control over the functionality of the devices that manipulate content
are fundamentally troubling for the future of innovation and the
future of law itself. It is easy enough to think of innovation as a kind
of mechanical evolution. The preserving of the rich evolution of any
system necessarily involves a willingness to allow the system to
mutate or be random at various points in order for there to be choices
that can be selected. If choices are squelched through technical
mandates directed at assuring the survival of particular business
models, new and interesting creatures-machines, applications, and
ways of interacting-will not come into being. The approaches taken
by the content industry in the broadcast flag and analog hole contexts,
if successful, may have the unintended (or intended) consequences of
(1) keeping new creatures (or new machines) from appearing and (2)
keeping a particular creature (the studios' business model) from
becoming extinct. Social Darwinism of the kind being invoked by the
MPAA has a long history in the U.S., and has been used as
justification for any number of ultimately undesirable end-goals.
Usually a Social Darwinist wants to argue against regulation that
would bolster a particular group; here, ironically, the content industry
is arguing for regulation to support its survival.
But the content industry has (perhaps inadvertently) hit on a
very important way of thinking about the law. Attention should be
paid to the evolutionary ecosystem of the law as the background
medium in which innovation occurs, business models evolve, and
social factions grow and prosper. There is now a greater
understanding that law and code are complementary; both law and
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code shape our world.2 This article argues that preserving the
flexibility and evolutionary richness of this code/law background
medium ("code/law") should be our aim. Both codes and laws that
unduly freeze innovation need to be avoided, so that code/law can
continue to evolve. This evolution would seek a "sweet spot" for both
code and law, a place somewhere between randomness and order that
allows for rich and interesting changes.
Concretely, the content industry should be adopting and using
many different forms of private digital rights management ("DRM")
techniques in which encryption follows the content, rather than being
applied by machines. More decentralized, contractual forms of legal
order such as those promoted by private DRM systems will allow
innovation in code/law to continue. No centralized decision maker
can adequately judge whether the particular tradeoff between
protection of content ("protect our material or broadcast television as
we know it will cease to exist") and innovation in machines
("manufacturers will be able to innovate as long as they follow the
rules") being urged by the content industry in 2004 is the right one.
These genes need to be tested in many places, allowing a cumulative
assessment to emerge. The FCC and Congress, by contrast, have only
interest groups to talk to, and cannot possibly come to the optimal
decision that will protect innovation and content in just the right way.
Protecting content locally, contractually, and privately will encourage
continued availability of choices, both of machines and of content.
This is the "sweet spot" of law and code that is more likely to produce
a fertile background environment for continued innovation and
change.
Part II of this Article draws out the key factual and legal themes
at play in the broadcast flag, plug and play, and analog hole
discussions now underway in the U.S. Part III presents the structural
questions posed by the content industry's use of evolutionary theory.
Part IV plays out the possible consequences of the content industry's
quest of keeping new creatures from appearing, keeping old creatures
alive, and trumping copyright law through technology. Part V
presents the "sweet spot" analysis for the code/law petri dish, and
suggests that private DRM efforts are more likely to produce
innovation than technology mandates, provided that competition
among DRM platform providers remains lively.
2. See R. Polk Wagner, The Case Against Software, - U. Penn. L. Rev. - (2003)
(working draft available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/research.html>
(accessed Nov. 9, 2003)) (proposing a new analytic framework for evaluating cyberspace
policy, based on reconceiving software as complementary to law).
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II. Background
More than three years ago, Napster focused global attention on
the challenges facing copyright owners in the digital age. Since then,
downloading, sharing, ripping and burning of online music files have
become widespread practices. While some of these uses are arguably
reasonable and legal, the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") and many in the recording industry believe that illegal
online file sharing has caused a significant decrease in CD sales.3 The
video content industry, for its part, is anxious to avoid the 30 to 40
percent loss in revenue that it believes has been experienced by the
music industry by filesharing, and is searching for legislative and
other solutions that will stave off similar losses.
The threat of digital redistribution is particularly acute for movie
studios and other video content producers because their business
models are today highly dependent on repurposing programming.
The current movie studio business model is based on studios' ability
to exploit multiple distribution streams for each work they produce.
Licensing and distribution agreements for these windows, domestic
and international box office, airline performances, pay-per-view,
rental, home sale, satellite, premium and basic cable, over-the-air
broadcast, etc., result in payment to the studios.4
3. According to data from The NPD Group, more than half of lost music sales
during the year between the fourth quarter of 2001 and the fourth quarter of 2002 can be
attributed to file sharing. But 60 percent of music consumers with access to the web have
not downloaded any music for free, and sales to those customers are off by as much as 7
percent. In general, consumers across all demographics are purchasing less music now, in
2003, than in the past two years. Total full-length CD sales were down 13 percent Q4 2002
compared to Q4 2001. Sales during the first quarter of 2003 were down by nine percent.
NPD Group, Declining Music Sales: It's Not All Digital Downloading, Says The NPD
Group, Press Releases <http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_030605.htm> (June 5,
2003). According to a recent Pew Internet and American Life Project survey, two-thirds of
internet users who download music do not care whether they are violating copyright laws.
The survey estimated that roughly 35 million American, representing 29 percent of
internet users, adults use file-sharing software. Pew Internet Project, Music Downloading,
File-sharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo <http://www.
pewinternet.org> (July 2003).
4. By 2006, movie theater admissions and the movie aftermarket (DVD sales,
rentals, TV) will be generating more than $50 billion in North America, according to
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Robert La Franco, Lots of money has been pumped into
Hollywood's first online movie distribution model, but is it really a viable business? Truth is,
it doesn't have to be, Red Herring <http://www.redherring.com/mag/issue122/5934.html>
(Feb. 3, 2003). Arguably, although the "broadcast flag" scheme discussed in this article
covers digital television, very few "high-quality" movies (protection of which is
presumably driving Hollywood to seek FCC protection) are seen first on television.
Television has traditionally been an aftermarket for theatrical releases.
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In March 2002, at the urging of the video content industry, Sen.
Hollings introduced his Consumer Broadband and Digital Television
Promotion Act. The Hollings bill, Sen. 2048, would have allowed the
FCC to mandate a security standard protective of digital content for
all "digital media devices"; the government was to develop a standard
if the private sector was unable to agree to one on its own. Under the
bill, it would have been illegal to make or provide a digital media
device that did not contain such standard security measures (or to
remove such measures).'
Proponents of the Hollings bill argued that the growth and
development of digital content (and broadband deployment
generally) was being stalled by the absence of protection systems, and
suggested that digital content would not be secure, and would not be
made available for distribution, until some form of DRM was
installed in all devices capable of displaying digital content. The
Hollings bill would have prohibited the sale or distribution of nearly
any kind of electronic device, from TV sets to personal digital
assistants to wristwatch cell phones to general purpose computers,
unless the device included DRM meeting standards set by the federal
government. Disney and others insisted that the consumer electronics
and information technology industries would not voluntarily agree to
DRM usage, because it would add costs to the devices without
providing consumers with what they would perceive to be added
value, and therefore, the government must mandate the inclusion of
DRMs.6 When public outcry forced the abandonment of the Hollings
bill, the content industry went back to the drawing board.7 They
found a convenient place for a precedent-setting "mini-Hollings"
approach in the context of the country's move towards digital
television.
A. Broadcast Flag Overview
The triggering event for the broadcast flag discussion is the digital
television ("DTV") transition scheduled to occur by 2006.8 Moving to
5. Sen. 2048, 107th Cong. § 5 (2002).
6. In testimony before Hollings' committee in connection with the bill, Disney
Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner accused technology firms like Intel Corp. of profiting
from digital piracy, and said they were not interested in working out a way to fix the
problem. Reuters, Digital Copyright Bill Inspires Flurry of Criticism
<http://emusician.com/ar/emusic digitalcopyright-bill-inspires/> (Apr. 10, 2002).
7. Id.
8. According to the Balanced Budget Act, 2006 is a target date for the transition;
however, FCC chairman Michael Powell admitted at the 2004 Consumer Electronics Show
that the 2006 date was "an aspiration date," not the final date. See also In the Matter of
HASTINGS COMM[ENT L.J. [25:603
THE BIOLOGY OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
DTV will release a good deal of radio spectrum for new uses (because
the broadcasters will use only their digital spectrum and will give back
their analog spectrum), and the FCC will auction licenses for this
spectrum, with the proceeds going to the federal government.
Congress has been assuming in its budgeting process that revenues
from the resulting spectrum will be more than $6 billion. Thus, there
has been tremendous Congressional pressure to complete the DTV
transition, and heavy political pressure has been exerted on the FCC
to do its part.9
Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital
Television, 17 FCC Rcd. 15,978, 15,978-79 (2002); Mark Hachman, Powell Riffs On DTV,
Wireless, Regulation, PC Magazine <http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,4149,1430119,00.asp> (January 9, 2004). The Commission has provided a second
channel for each existing full service to use for DTV service in making the transition from
the existing analog (NTSC) TV technology to the new DTV technology. At the end of the
DTV transition, which is currently scheduled for December 31, 2006, broadcasters must
relinquish one of their two channels. A finding that the digital transition has occurred in a
particular area is dependent on penetration of DTV devices, for example, if 85 percent of
receiving homes have switched to DTV devices, the transition will be found to have
occurred. As of October 2003, less than 1 percent of television households have a DTV
receiver. Some have argued that the DTV transition has nothing to do with the broadcast
flag, and that the transition provides only a useful regulatory moment for action. See, e.g.,
Letters from Consumers Union and Public Knowledge, infra n. 23.
9. Title III of the Communications Act covers DTV issues, including broadcaster
eligibility for DTV licenses, DTV signal quality, and DTV ancillary and supplementary
services. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (granting authority to regulate home electronic
equipment in order to ensure that the equipment can withstand interference); Id. § 303(s)
(granting authority to regulate television receivers in order to ensure that all such
receivers adequately receive all television broadcasting signals); Id. § 303(u) (instructing
Commission to require that television receivers be equipped to display closed-caption
television transmissions); Id. §§ 303(x), 330(c)) (instructing Commission to require that
television receivers to be equipped to permit viewers to block the reception of programs
with a common rating). Critics of the FCC's assertion of authority in the flag proceeding
have said that this DTV-related Title cannot be extended to cover manufacturers because
it is explicitly limited to broadcaster issues, and have argued that in the absence of explicit
statutory authority the Commission may not act to regulate consumer electronics inter-
operability and adopt encoding rules in the broadcast arena. FCC's jurisdiction to
regulate consumer electronics/IT devices has been questioned. The Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking issued by the FCC in connection with the broadcast flag proceeding sought
comment on "the jurisdictional basis for Commission rules dealing with broadcast copy
protection." In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 02-230 (August 9, 2002), at 3-4. It is fair to say that the
FCC's jurisdiction in this area is far from certain. Indeed, the FCC devoted more than five
pages of its Report and Order to explaining why it had jurisdiction to issue such a set of
rules, and appears to be anticipating near-term challenges to its assertion of rulemaking
authority. In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Content Protection, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 02-230 (November 4, 2003), pp.
13-18 (hereinafter "Order 02-230"). And "key Members of Congress are split about the
FCC's jurisdiction in this area. Some members of Congress (Hollings and Tauzin) believe
that the FCC has authority to impose broadcast flag regulations while others believe that
2003]
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DTV will be broadcast "in the clear" (in unencrypted form).'"
Movie studios and other video producers are concerned that homes
and individuals with internet access will soon be able to share movie-
length digital broadcast files that they receive with the same ease that
they now share unencrypted music files, and that widespread online
piracy will be the result. In the absence of a copy protection scheme,
some content providers have asserted that they will not permit high
quality programming to be broadcast digitally." Without such
programming, the fear is that consumers will not buy DTV
transmitters, which will delay the DTV transition. 2
such regulation is outside the FCC's purview (Leahy and Sensenbrenner)." Comments of
Philips Electronics North America Corporation (Philips) in MB Docket No. 02-230 (Dec.
6, 2002), at 32. In comments submitted to the FCC on September 23, 2003, Philips
questioned the FCC's jurisdiction in the absence of an express statutory mandate, pointing
out that the Plug and Play Order (discussed infra) was based on statutory authority
conferred by Sections 624A and 629 of the Communications Act of 1934. Philips also
noted that the "no tech mandates" clause of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Section 1201(c)(3), expressed a Congressional policy against imposing specific content
protection mandates on electronics manufacturers. Notice of ex parte meeting, Philips
Electronics, FCC MB Docket No. 02-230 (submitted Sept. 23, 2003). The FCC, for its part,
did not assert in its Order adopting the flag scheme that it had direct, explicit statutory
authority to regulate equipment manufacturers. It did, however, reject the argument that
an explicit grant of authority from Congress was required for it to act, asserting that it had
ancillary jurisdiction based on the relationship between the broadcast flag rules and its
broad jurisdiction over radio broadcasts. Order 02-230 at 17. The FCC "recognize[d] that
the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over manufacturers of equipment in the past
has typically been tied to specific statutory provisions and that this is the first time the
Commission has exercised ... jurisdiction over consumer equipment manufacturers in this
manner," but stated that "even though this may be the first time the Commission exercises
its ancillary jurisdiction over equipment manufacturers in this manner, the nation now
stands at a juncture where such exercise of authority is necessary." Id. The FCC
apparently believed that lack of jurisdiction was not enough of a reason not to act, given
the enormous pressure being exerted on the agency by the content industry.
10. There is no regulatory mandate that television broadcasts be unencrypted.
However, the U.S. tradition of "free" over the air broadcast leads many to believe that
television broadcasts should not be encrypted at their source. The question the broadcast
flag proceeding presents is, "If encryption is necessary to protect high-quality digital
content, who does the encryption-the broadcasters or the machines that receive the
signal?" The content industry wants to ensure that machines do this work. As suggested
later in this Article, it is not clear why broadcast television should be protected so fiercely
by the FCC.
11. See, e.g., Comments of Viacom, FCC MB Docket No. 02-230, at 2-4 (submitted
Dec. 6, 2002). Viacom notes that "In the 2001-2002 season, all but one of CBS's scripted
prime-time programs were broadcast in HD. And for the 2002-2003 season, CBS is
offering all 19 of its prime-time comedies and dramas in HD." Viacom later withdrew its
threat not to broadcast high-quality content.
12. Thus, from the content owners' perspective, public policy makers are asking them
to urgently do something to promote the digital transition; content makers will not put
high quality programming out unless it is protected; so the broadcast flag rules need to be
put in place right away to protect the fall lineup. Now that the fall lineup is already being
[25:603
In order to provide some measure of protection for DTV
content, the MPAA and the Digital Transmission Licensing
Administrator, LLC ("DTLA") proposed a "broadcast flag" scheme
to the FCC (the "MPAA/5C Proposal").'3 In essence, the studios
proposed that any future device capable of modulating or
demodulating DTV content be designed to:
" check for the presence of a flag;
* encrypt any flagged content using approved technologies;
* allow creation of digital recordings of flagged content using
only authorized copy protection technologies; and
" allow digital transmission of flagged content only via
secured digital outputs to other "compliant" devices
(authorized devices that are appropriately secure and
themselves ensure that protected content cannot be digitally
retransmitted in an insecure fashion to noncompliant
devices or over the internet).
In other words, the proposed rule (largely adopted by the FCC in
November 2003) mandates that DTV demodulators and all devices
receiving content from them (including computers, DVD recorders,
digital video recorders, and other devices) be built to robustly protect
digital content marked by the flag. Starting in 2005, all newly-
manufactured equipment capable of demodulating, storing, or
copying content that originates as a DTV signal will have to have
broadcast, the MPAA has switched to another rationale for quick adoption of the
broadcast flag: avoiding the creation of heaps of "noncompliant" legacy devices. "Until
rules requiring devices to respond to the Flag are in effect, every DTV device sold
becomes a legacy device that will delay full realization of the objective the Flag is intended
to achieve-curtailing the redistribution of DTV content on digital networks.... Delay
now places more legacy devices in the market three or four years from now, when
redistribution of video files could force content owners to migrate from free broadcast
television to more secure delivery systems. The time to close the barn door is before, not
after the horse has escaped." Order 02-230, supra n. 9 (Letter from Fritz Attaway, MPAA
Executive Vice President, Government Relations, to Kenneth Ferree, FCC Media Bureau,
Oct. 8, 2003).
13. In a highly unusual regulatory move, the Commission's notice of proposed
rulemaking did not include the text of an actual proposed rule. In the Matter of Digital
Broadcast Copy Protection, MB Docket No. 02-230, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67
Fed. Reg. 53903 (Aug. 20, 2002) ("NPRM"). A proposed rule is attached to the Joint
Comments of the Motion Picture Ass'n of America, et al. (submitted Dec. 6, 2002), filed in
connection with the FCC's NPRM. The "5C" consortium is made up of Hitachi Ltd., Intel
Corporation, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., Sony Corporation, and Toshiba
Corporation. 5C has developed the Digital Transmission Content Protection System, or
DTCP, which offers secure electrical transmission of compressed content over particular
interconnections. DTLA is the licensing authority joint venture founded by the 5C
companies, which administers the licensing of DTCP.
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approved copy protection technologies built in. These devices will
include future digital televisions and set-top boxes, as well as
computers or other future hardware or software capable of
demodulating a DTV broadcast (or receiving content from a device
that has demodulated the signal). Approved technologies will use
encryption-based digital content protection to ensure that the
standards for use and distribution are obeyed and, in particular, to
ensure that content cannot be sent "out" of digital outputs in the
device unless the content provider so authorizes. Only approved
content protection technologies will be permitted to handle marked
programs. Only approved content protection technologies will be
permitted to handle marked programs.14 Obviously, this approach
entails mandating design changes in a range of consumer-electronics
and information-technology devices, to ensure that these devices
monitor incoming data streams for the presence of flags.
Because all devices touching DTV content would have to
incorporate approved technologies, the process for approval has been
both critical and controversial. The MPAA/5C proposal
contemplated that technologies could be added to a Table A when
they were used or approved by three major studios or ten major
device manufacturers. The technologies could also be added when the
technology was found to be "at least as effective" as other Table A
technologies. The FCC was supposed to rule on all applications under
any of these criteria for addition to Table A, and to revoke Table A
authorization if the technology has been "substantially
compromised.'
5
As part of the process that led up to the MPAA/5C Proposal,
Fox suggested that a particular suite of copy protection technologies,
the 5C suite, which includes DTCP, HDCP, D-VHS, and CPRM, be
added to Table A immediately. 6 None of these technologies allows
14. Order 02-230, supra n. 9, at pp. 25-27.
15. Id. at 14.
16. This proposal was made as part of the proceedings of the Broadcast Protection
Discussion Group ("BPDG"), which is a subgroup of the Copy Protection Technical
Working Group ("CPTWG"). CPTWG was formed in 1996 by members of the
information technology, consumer electronics, and motion picture industries. Led by the
MPAA, it is "a non-exclusive, non-legislative, non-binding forum that [meets] regularly to
investigate and seek consensus on technological solutions for various content protection
challenges.... [T]he CPTWG is not a standard-setting organization and has no authority
to promulgate or even recommend particular technologies. Even where consensus on a
particular technological approach has been reached within the CPTWG, implementation
is always left to entities outside the forum." Testimony before House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Protecting Content in the Digital Age, Statement of Mr. Peter
Chernin, President and Chief Operating Officer, News Corp. (Apr. 25, 2002) (available at
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transmission over the internet (even secure transmission) of any
flagged content.1 7 The MPAA/5C Proposal also stated that regulated
products may not include switches, buttons, or functions that allow
the Compliance Requirements to be defeated. Nor may they allow
defeat of these requirements by widely available tools or inexpensive
software. 8
The licensing rules accompanying Table A technologies will have
significant impact. For example, the DTLA license for DTCP does
not allow digital outputs of content save to devices that use one of the
other three "5C suite" technologies. 9 This means that once a
2002 WL 20316553). The BPDG Co-Chairs, Robert Perry of Mitsubishi Digital
Electronics America, Michael Ripley of Intel Corporation, and Andrew Setos of Fox
Group / Fox Technology Group, released a report in June 2002 that forms the basis for the
MPAA/5C Proposal. See Robert Ferry, et al., Final Report of the Co-Chairs of the
Broadcast Protection Discussion Subgroup to the Copy Protection Technical Working
Group <http://www.cptwg.org/assets/bpdg/bpdg%20report.doc> (Jun. 3, 2002). The Co-
Chairs' report did not represent a "consensus" view of the information technology,
consumer electronics, and motion picture industries. Comments opposing the conclusions
reached in the report were submitted by Philips, Thomson, and Zenith, among other
companies. The Philips/Thomson/Zenith comments noted that these companies
"fundamentally object[ed] to the process by which BPDG was conducted"-most if not all
of the key negotiations were conducted behind closed doors among the studios and the 5C
companies. See Phillips, et al., Comments Submitted by Philips, Thomson and Zenith on
the Report of the Broadcast Protection Discussion Subgroup to the Copy Protection
Technical Working Group <http://www.cptwg.org/assets/bpdg/tab%20p-04.doc> (May 29,
2002).
17. DTCP offers secure transmission of compressed content over electrical
interconnections (USB, IEEE 1394, and MOST); CPRM offers secure storage of
compressed content; HDCP offers secure transmission of uncompressed protected content
over an electrical interconnection (DVI); and D-VHS offers secure storage of
uncompressed protected content. Thus, each of these technologies does a different thing.
The DTLA has approved only three technologies to protect DTCP-protected content:
CPRM, D-VHS, and HDCP. Until recently, none of these technologies allowed
transmission of flagged content over wireless networks. DTCP, for example, was designed
to operate over IEEE 1394 ("firewire") and USB networks, but not over WiFi. In late
September 2003, the DTLA proposed a form of DTCP for WiFi (DTCP-IP) to the FCC.
The MPAA/5C Proposal states that DTCP, CPRM, D-VHS, and HDCP "have already
gained sufficient industry acceptance to qualify as authorized technologies." MPAA/5C
Proposal, supra n. 13, at 57.
18. The MPAA/5C Proposal contained an absolute requirement: to "effectively
frustrate attempts to defeat" its proposed compliance requirements. Some IT companies
have argued that this standard will be prohibitively expensive to meet. See, e.g., Letter
from the Business Software Alliance and the Computer Systems Policy Project (collectively,
the "IT Coalition") to the FCC, MB Docket No. 02-230, October 2, 2003. The FCC
adopted an "ordinary user" effectiveness standard in its Order. Order at p. 23.
19. See Digital Transmission Licensing Adminstration, DTCP Adopters Agreement,
example B, Part 1, Section 4.4 <http://www.dtcp.com/data/
DTCPAdoptersAgreementOlO730.PDF> (July 2001). The DTCP license does permit
"constrained" (down-resolutioned, or "down-rezzed") digital output over a DVI interface
to computer products manufactured before 2005. Because data traveling through a DVI
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consumer initiates a home network based on DTCP, the network will
form a closed circle. Thus, no devices can be added to that network
unless they also are part of the 5C world. No 5C devices will
interoperate with non-5C devices according to the current terms of
the 5C license.2' These licenses could contain any number of
overreaching terms.2"
In order to ensure that it is not too easy to circumvent the
protections offered by an approved technology, a set of "Robustness
Requirements" for the flag were also proposed by the MPAA. These
required that products meet a specified level of secure design and
construction by employing encryption techniques and being tamper
resistant.22 The standard proposed by the MPAA in Section X.17 of
their proposed broadcast flag rule was that content protection
systems should be implemented so that they could not be defeated by
using general purpose tools widely available at a reasonable price.
Robustness rules generally exclude open source software products
from consideration because users can modify these products.
As of October 2003, the FCC had received both initial and reply
comments on its broadcast flag NPRM. More than 6000 comments,
many of which came from individuals, were filed in this proceeding.
As rumors of an October 2003 action by the FCC in the flag
interface is uncompressed (and therefore hard to manipulate easily), and because
restrictions on image quality are unlikely to be appealing to consumers, this exception
does not appear terribly meaningful. The DTCP license also allows the use of technologies
other than CPRM or D-VHS for the making of up to two first-generation copies, provided
that the copy cannot be played on any device other than the (secure, compliant, 5C-world)
device making the copy.
20. Id. In other words, existing DVD recorders and players (of which there are 41
million already in consumers' hands) and all other existing storage or copying devices will
not work with a flag-compliant TV receiver. This may mean substantial upgrade costs to
consumers, who will not be able to watch DTV on their DVD players. An October 16,
2003 letter from Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) to Chairman Michael Powell of the FCC
made many of the points urged by consumer advocates in this setting, and stated,
"[T]housands of American consumers have filed comments with the Commission, and
consumer advocate groups contend that granting this petition would significantly impact
the commonplace viewing and recording of broadcast television that consumers have
become accustomed to since the introduction of the VCR more than twenty years ago."
21. For example, the privacy impacts of redistribution-control technology are
unknown, and license agreements could require consumers to agree to many varieties of
tracking. Having the ability to offer consumers finely-tuned rights packages carries with it
the ability to know what each individual is watching, where that person lives, and how long
they watch what they watch, currently broadcasters do not collect this information.
22. See Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al., MB
Docket No. 02-230 (filed Dec. 6, 2002), at 10 (stating that "[tihe Commission should adopt
rules implementing the Broadcast Flag solution" as well as "rules to resolve any
outstanding compliance, robustness, and enforcement issues").
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proceeding began to circulate, several industry and consumer
advocacy groups urged the FCC not to act on the entire MPAA/5C
Proposal, but rather to divide the proceeding into two parts: (1)
adopting the labeling standard for the flag that has been chosen by
the NTSC (but not yet adopted by the FCC), and (2) issuing a further
rulemaking notice seeking comment "on complex and critically
important certification and de-certification rules for technologies
authorized for digital broadcast copy protection."23 The MPAA
reacted strongly to this suggestion, saying: "The IT Coalition has
asked the Commission to follow the lead of Nero-to fiddle while
Rome bums. The public interest requires more responsible action. 24
In November 2003, the FCC issued a Report and Order in the
broadcast flag proceeding. In a gesture towards consumer advocates,
the Commission established an interim process for certification of
approved content protection technologies to be managed by the FCC
rather than the studios, and did not expressly adopt the 5C suite.
Many commentators believe, however, that the 5C suite will be
approved in short order, thus creating the lock-in and interoperability
"first mover" effects discussed above. 26
23. Letter from BSA and CSPP (IT Coalition Letter), MB Docket No. 02-230 (filed
Oct. 2, 2003). See also Letter from Consumers Union and Public Knowledge (filed Oct. 3,
2003) (supporting IT Coalition approach). A larger point made by consumer advocates
and computer companies has been that the broadcast flag simply will not be effective,
given that it does not constrain the analog outputs that link consumers' televisions with
their cable and satellite set-top boxes, their VCRs, their TiVos, and their DVD recorders.
See Section II(C), infra, concerning "plugging the analog hole." There are many other
"holes" that will continue to allow leakage of digital broadcasts for years to come: the
"legacy hole," by which the millions of existing unprotected digital outputs on legacy
devices that do not recognize the flag can be used to transmit digital broadcast files (the
Consumers Electronics Association has estimated that 700,000 DTV receivers have been
manufactured); the "studio hole," by which studio insiders, their reviewers, and theaters
leak digital copies (see Simon Byers et al., Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie
Production and Distribution Process <http://www.pdmcdan.com/docs/drm03.pdf> (Sept.
17, 2003)); and the "photon hole," by which cameras are held up in movie theaters to
record films, see Ed Felten, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Hearing on Consumer Privacy and Government Technology Mandates in the Digital Media
Marketplace <http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/FeltenTestimony-091703.pdf> (Sept. 17,
2003).
24. Letter, MPAA to Kenneth Ferree (Oct. 8, 2003).
25. FCC, In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Content Protection, Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking <http://www.hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmathch/FCC-03-273A.pdf> (Nov. 4, 2003).
26. E.g. Rob Pegoraro, FCC Deserves a Digital Thanks For Nothing, Washington
Post F07 (Nov. 9, 2003): "As for new digital cables, the FCC ruling does not mandate any
one copy-control technology, leaving it up to companies to choose from competing
options. But this competition probably won't happen. Most of the electronics industry has
anointed one system, called "5C" after the five corporations that developed it (Hitachi,
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B. Plug and Play Overview
Meanwhile, the FCC has taken up the cable compatibility
"digital plug and play" proceeding. 7 For nearly a decade, Congress
has been urging the FCC to adopt technical standards to allow a
direct connection between your television products and cable service.
The cable and consumer electronics industries reached agreement on
standards, but the content industry intervened and asked that copy
protection technologies be included in any "plug and play"
agreement-including "encoding rules" dictating what uses could be
made of cable broadcasts by consumers. Additionally, Hollywood
asked that (1) "selectable output control" be permitted (which would
mean that a content owner could remotely control which outputs
work on users' sets, making it possible to block analog outputs in
favor of secured digital outputs); and (2) manufacturers be required
to "down-res" (make less sharp) content flowing out of any analog
output on a digital cable receiver. Both of these steps were aimed at
assuring a controlled digital future by (eventually) making analog
outputs unusable.
The plug and play proposal was designed to result in regulations
that codified an agreement reached between major cable system
operators and consumer electronics managers. 28 This proposal would
allow consumer DTV sets to be connected directly to digital cable
systems as long as the outputs of the consumer DTV sets were
sufficiently secure, thus eliminating the need for special cable set-top
boxes. The idea is that the availability of digital cable television
receivers and products will encourage more consumers to convert to
DTV, thereby furthering the DTV transition.
Under the proposed Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"),
only devices using only wired digital network connections (IEEE
Intel, Matsushita, Sony and Toshiba) and already approved for the digital outputs on
future cable boxes and cable-compatible TV sets. The FCC can approve other copy-
control schemes, but 5C-compliant hardware may not be upgradeable to support these
competing mechanisms, placing them at a disadvantage. Once a show enters the 5C
copyright cocoon, your options to use it shrink. The FCC's statement that "the flag does
not restrict copying in any way" ignores the fact that 5C eliminates your ability to play
back recordings on existing hardware, since almost none of it complies with the 5C
standard."
27. See In the Matter of Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer
Electronics Equipment, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, PP Docket No. 00-67 (Apr. 14,
2000).
28. See Ex Parte Letter and Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") (with
attachments), CS Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67 (Dec. 19, 2002) (filed by major
cable system operators and consumer electronics managers) <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-03-3A2.pdf> (accessed Jan. 4. 2004).
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1394) (and 5C copy protection technologies) could be labeled as
"Digital Cable Ready," and thus Bluetooth and Internet Protocol
connections would not be allowed on such devices.29
On October 9, 2003, the FCC released its Second Report and
Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the
Plug and Play proceeding. It adopted the labeling rules proposed in
the MOU, but concluded that additional public comment was needed
in order to determine how and on what conditions new connectors or
content protection technologies will be approved for use with
unidirectional digital cable televisions and products.3' The FCC also
decided to ban selectable output control and down-rezzing, and to
limit the levels of copy protection that could be applied to various
categories of programming. In other words, the FCC split the
proceeding into two parts: labeling (now decided on), and new copy
protection beyond the 5C suite of technologies (still under
discussion).
Because 65 percent or more of US consumers receive their
television through cable connections,31 the decision in the plug and
play proceeding effectively pre-decided the broadcast flag (DTV)
questions: it would have made little sense, the content industry
argued, to have one set of content-protection rules apply to cable and
satellite and a different set of rules apply to broadcast.32 Digital cable-
29. This means that personal computers may not be able to be labeled as Digital
Cable Ready under the current form of the plug and play regime. Microsoft and others
have argued that the FCC should ensure that PCs and other open-architecture consumer
IT devices are not foreclosed from being marketed as Digital Cable Ready. See, e.g.,
Microsoft August 8, 2003 ex parte communication and Comments of ATI Technologies,
Dell Computer Corporation, Hewlett-Packard Company, Intel Corporation, Microsoft
Corporation and NEC Corporation, filed March 28, 2003, both in PP Docket No. 00-67.
30. Id. at 35.
31. The FCC released a report in December 2002 stating that 85.3 percent of
"television households" in the US receive their signals through cable and/or satellite
systems. See FCC Ninth Annual Report, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition
in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 02-145 (Dec. 31,
2002). The National Cable & Telecommunications Association reports that the cable
penetration of US television households in May 2003 was 67.4 percent. See National Cable
& Telecommunications Association, Homepage <http://www.ncta.com> (accessed Aug. 11,
2003).
32. The MPAA took the position at the FCC that the version of the plug and play
proposal before the Commission as of August 2003 "perpetuates the analog hole and
discourages a complete transition from analog to digital," yet another invocation of the
need for a complete "evolution" towards digital. MPAA Ex Parte Presentations in CS
Docket No.97-80 (Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996;
Commercial availability of Navigation Devices); PP Docket No.00-67 (Compatibility
Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment); and MB Docket No.02-
230 (Digital Broadcast Copy Protection) (Aug. 13, 2003) (emphasis added). Whether
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ready devices must use the 5C suite of technologies in connection
with receiving digital cable.33 This means that the lock-in effect of 5C
had already happened, no matter what the FCC did with the
broadcast flag. Because the licenses associated with the 5C suite
forbid interoperating with other copy protection technologies, we will
all soon be in a world in which only 5C-protected digital interfaces are
authorized.
C. Analog Hole Overview
At a Cato Policy conference on February 5, 2003, Andy Setos of
Fox made clear that even if the broadcast flag scheme was
implemented as proposed it would not be adequately effective to stop
the digital copying of copyrighted DTV works." The reason? The
broadcast flag proceeding deals only with locking down digital
outputs of devices, and the resulting rule will not constrain analog
outputs. This means that "flagged" digital material could be captured
from an analog output such as one contained in an analog video
display device (e.g., a VCR), transformed into high-quality analog
form, and then redigitized-in the process, the "flag" being
considered by the FCC would be lost (because it was not part of the
analog content), and the result of this digital-analog-digital
conversion would be a high-quality file that was available for perfect
and unlimited digital copying and transmission with no "flag"
attached.35 The content industry is concerned that control needs to be
broadcast and cable need to be protected by the same copy protection technologies is an
assumption that is questioned in Section IV(B) infra. At any rate, the oddness of the
MPAA's pushing for the broadcast flag, which leaves the analog hole unplugged (see infra
Section II(C)), at the same time it opposed the plug and play agreement on the grounds
that it perpetuated that same analog hole, is notable.
33. See Ex. B to the Cable/CE MOU (Compliance Rules), Section 2.4, supra n. 28, at
61: "A Unidirectional Digital Cable Product shall not output Controlled Content, or pass
Controlled Content, to any output in digital form except as permitted by this Section 2.4."
Sections 2.4. 1 and 2.4.2, in turn, require use of DTCP and HDCP, both members of the
5C suite.
34. Fritz Attaway, Motion Picture Association of America; Jim Burger, Dow, Lohnes
& Albertson; Mike Godwin, Public Knowledge; Andy Setos, Fox Entertainment Group,
Address, Battle over the Broadcast Flag: The IP Wars and the HDTV Transition (Feb. 5,
2003) (copy on file with Cato Policy Forum), audio / video available at
<http://www.cato.org/events/030205pf.html> (accessed Jan. 4, 2004).
35. Closing the analog hole would require finding a means to secure "component
video analog outputs" in ways similar to means available for digital video interfaces.
Consensus "watermark" coding would have to be read by downstream analog-to-digital
converters able to handle DTV content; the converted digital video would have to be
handled "securely" in the same manner as digital interfaces for the same content.
Legislation would be required to mandate such changes. Shapiro testimony, supra n.16.
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extended to any outlet through which digital material could "leak"
into analog form without the flag and then be redigitized-in popular
parlance, they believe that they have to plug the "analog hole.,
36
In an April 2002 "Content Protection Status Report" provided to
the Senate Judiciary Committee by the Motion Picture Association of
America, the MPAA said that analog-to-digital converters needed to
be regulated to ensure that they responded to a "watermarking"
technology that would survive digital to analog conversion.37 This is a
very broad goal, because analog-to-digital converters are present in
any number of machines that are basic to science, computing,
mathematics, health, and many other fields.
For the process of plugging the analog hole to proceed, a
watermarking or other technology will need to be chosen that
survives digital-analog-digital conversion. Led by the MPAA, the
information technology, consumer electronics, and entertainment
industries formed a discussion group in February 2003 (the Analog
Reconversion Discussion Group, ARDG or "are-dog") to work on
this issue. ARDG's charter states that it will "identify[] technological
tools that may be relevant to addressing security issues arising from
the conversion of protected, copyrighted commercial audiovisual
content from digital to analog format and reconversion to digital
format." So far, the ARDG is discussing various technologies that
might (or might not) carry rights signaling information from
protected digital sources across analog interfaces. This rights signaling
36. Interestingly, the MPAA has frequently referred to the existence of the analog
hole in defending against attacks on digital rights management (DRM) systems. Both in
the Library of Congress DMCA rulemaking hearings, and in the "2600 litigation"
(lawsuits brought against 2600 Magazine over its publishing an article containing DVD
decoding software and linking to the software; see generally <http://www.eff.org/
IP/Video/MPAADVD-cases/> (accessed Jan. 4, 2004)), content industry representatives
suggested that people wanting to make fair uses of DVDs which were prevented by
content scrambling technology (CSS) could use analog outputs to make those uses. In the
broadcast flag proceeding, the MPAA has pointed to the continued availability of
unprotected analog connections as the reason why the proposed broadcast flag scheme
"would not impact" (and would therefore not trouble) individual consumers:
The Broadcast Flag requirement will have no impact on consumers' existing
equipment...... Since analog outputs are a permitted output under the
Requirements, existing analog displays, players, and recorders will continue to
function with the new compliant products under the Compliance and Robustness
Requirements.
MPAA/5C Proposal, supra n. 13, at 27-28.
Obviously, closing the analog hole does not fit with this statement. As noted
above, the MPAA is pushing towards a complete "transition" away from analog.
37. See MPAA, Content Protection Status Report <http://judiciary.senate.gov/
special/content-protection.pdf> (Apr. 25, 2002).
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information will then need to be detected by devices that reconvert
the content to digital form. The overall goal is to find some way of
preserving "states" of content protection through digital-analog-
digital conversions.
In a slide presentation during an early meeting, the Chief
Technology Officer of the MPAA framed the issue confronting the
ARDG in terms of evolution:
* For legacy analog devices, protected digital video content
must be converted to analog video signals.
* Analog video signals can be easily converted to digital
without any obligations to preserve the content's usage
rights information.
* Since the usage rights are not managed equivalently, the
natural transition from analog to an all-digital world is
impeded.38
As discussed earlier, a content industry representative put the issue
even more strongly during an early ARDG meeting, saying in effect
that the absence of rules in the analog world was preventing natural
evolution towards digital, even though digital was clearly a superior
technology. 9
Thus, the challenge undertaken by the ARDG world is to
guarantee "equivalence" between digital outputs subject to the
broadcast flag scheme and analog converters. Assuming that digital
outputs will be controlled by approved content protection technology
under the broadcast flag scheme, the content industry's goal is to
ensure that any analog output is as least as controlled as the digital.
This will mean that analog converters and devices will have to be
sufficiently robust (non-tamperable by users) and compliant
("watching" for flagged content to arrive, and ensuring encryption of
flagged content) to meet the broadcast flag standards.
As of the date of this paper, the ARDG had issued a Call for
Information that included a matrix of questions against which
available technologies can be measured (e.g., "How does the scheme
carry rights signaling information from protected digital sources
across analog interfaces and back into a digital sink?"),' and had
38. Brad Hunt, Chief Technology Officer, MPAA, Presentation to the Analog
Reconversion Discussion Group, Analog Reconversion Reference Architecture Proposal
<http://www.cptwg.org/Assets/Presentations/ARDG/AnalogReconvRefArch03-05.pps>
(Mar. 5, 2003) (emphasis added).
39. See Author's Personal Notes, supra n. 1.
40. Copy Protection Technical Working Group, ARDG Call For Information and
Matrix <www.cptwg.org> (Jul. 30, 2003). The Matrix includes the following question: "To
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listened to presentations from manufacturers of technologies who
believed their products should be recommended by ARDG (but not
subjected to independent, third-party testing)." Observers predict
that the resulting filled-in matrix document (containing the
manufacturers' representations about their technologies in answer to
the ARDG's questions) will be sent to Congress with a demand for a
bill that will require development of (and use of) technologies
meeting the stated requirements.
Ill. Evolution and Innovation
Evolution is a simple process: genes fluctuate or mutate.
Individuals are selected. Populations change. Without fluctuation in
the genes (or whatever other unit of inheritance is of interest),
evolution cannot occur.
Evolution is not necessarily progress, although it is tempting to
think of man as the final, triumphant link in an ever-improving chain
of being. Organisms do not evolve so that they will be more efficient
or useful later. Instead, populations adapt to their current
surroundings through aggregated selection events, when chance
fluctuations result in an increase in the reproductive success of their
carriers. In order for this adaptation to take place, for natural
selection to operate, there must be mechanisms to increase or create
genetic fluctuations which are themselves the result of chance.
Evolutionary theory is not deterministic; it does not suggest that there
is a "solution" to any evolutionary "problem." Evolution is about
variation. Modern biologic empirical work focuses on the distribution
of characteristics within populations, rather than positing that there
will be one particularly adaptive feature that has enabled a particular
organism to survive.
Biological systems are part of a larger category of complex
adaptive systems,"2 which include the environment, insect populations,
what extent, considered purely as a technical matter, and considered apart from rights-
allocation choices made by the content owner or distributor does the scheme create side
effects in the use of material?" This question will be the repository for consumer groups'
concerns about fair use of material.
41. Copy Protection Technical Working Group, Agenda and Meeting Notes <www.
cptwg.org> (Oct. 22, 2003).
42. Generally, a complex system is understood as a set of interacting elements in
which the interactions are nonlinear. A complex adaptive system (or CAS) is a complex
system that has the capacity to modify its own state (through, e.g., evolutionary change).
In CAS, patterns at higher levels emerge from local processes and selection operating at
lower levels. Complexity as a field is associated with the Santa Fe Institute. See Ted Fuller
& Paul Moran, Small Firms as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Review <http://www.
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the economy, the human brain, law, and many others"3-that are
characterized by irreversibility," stability,45 bifurcation" and symmetry
breaking.47 From complexity theory we know that adaptation is the
key to innovation, resilience, and sustainability in any complex
system, and no discipline teaches us more about adaptation than
biology. Perhaps biology has something to teach us about innovation
and law.48
sbaer.uca.edu/Research/1999/ICSB/99icsO52.htm> (accessed Jan. 21, 2004). The study of
CAS is focused on how complicated structures and patterns of interaction can arise from
random actions. The essential elements of any CAS are: different and diverse parts
(sustained diversity and individuality of components); localized interactions among those
components; and an autonomous process that selects from among those components,
based on the results of local interactions, a subset for replication or enhancement. Simon
A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems, 1 Ecosystems 431,
431-436 (1998).
43. J.B. Ruh], Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev.
933 (1997); Margaret Gruter et al. (eds.), Law, Biology and Culture: The Evolution of
Law, Ross-Erikson (Santa Barbara, CA) 1983; E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985). The Law and Biology movement
has provided biological models that help us understand the dynamics of legal change. We
can gather data about a legal situation and decide, through pattern recognition, whether
we have a particular instance of a biological phenomenon before us. Elliott, Law and
Biology, 41 St. Louis L. Rev. 595, 621 (1997).
44. Complex adaptive systems do not have the same outcomes when they are run
from the same initial conditions, so they are not deterministic. Random processes like
these (non-deterministic) are subject to the irreversible consequences for future behavior
of the system; they are subject to the "legacy of history." Laura Gonzalez-Guzman &
Peter T. Hraber, What is Complexity? <http://sevilleta.unm.edu/-ehdecker/complexity/
96fall/complexity.html> (accessed Oct. 3, 2003).
45. CAS tend to settle into stable organizational patterns, but different stable
organizations in different environments.
46. "The most exciting aspect of nonequilibrium phenomena is that the same physical
system can show a great variety of behaviors, each corresponding to a different attractor.
The mechanism which is at the origin of this diversification is the instability of a reference
state and the subsequent bifurcation of new branches of states as the parameters built in
the system are varied." Gregoire Nicolis, Physics of far-from-equilibrium systems and self-
organisation, in The New Physics 316, 333-34 (Paul Davies ed., Cambridge University
Press 1989).
47. An imaginary person inside a system at equilibrium (a cube of water, for
example) would have no perception of time or space; everything would seem the same. If
the system is pushed far from equilibrium (by heating, for example), a notion of space will
emerge in this minute observer, because collective, complex actions inside the system will
occur. "We call this emergence of a notion of space in a system in which, until then, this
notion could not be perceived in an intrinsic manner symmetry breaking. In a way,
symmetry breaking brings us from a static, geometrical view of space to a view whereby
the space is shaped by the functions going on in the system." Id. at 318.
48. In other words, through pattern recognition we may see some things in law and
innovation that remind us of what we have learned about biology. The basic notion is that
law and innovation both use information and selection in a way that is similar to genetic
reproduction, variation, and selection. Biology provides a useful metaphor for
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Complex adaptive systems are nonlinear, and thus unpredictable.
While this nonlinearity may be an annoyance for those who would
like to predict where a particular system may end up, it is the system's
adeptness at avoiding being locked into linear behavior that allows it
to adapt to changing circumstances-just as innovation in consumer
electronics allows adaptation to the changing world. Researchers
have found that the most resilient systems are those that manage to
stay balanced between extreme order (such as a monoculture that
embraces a single PC operating system) and extreme chaos (in which
no computer could interact with any other). In a sense, these systems
are drawing as much as possible from the adaptive qualities of
nonlinearity without falling all the way into nothingness/randomness.
They are being held back from the edge of this cliff by the presence of
ordered, linear behavioral qualities in the system-such as, in the case
of biology, natural selection. The next sections of this article map
these qualities of complex adaptive systems to the current debate
about the broadcast flag, the plug and play agreement, and the analog
hole.
A. Survival of the Fittest
It is very strange for the MPAA to say that the natural order of
things requires that rules be imposed to allow progress to result, that
only regulation will allow the "survival of the fittest" dictated by
Charles Darwin's theories. But that is, in fact, what certain elements
of the content industry are asserting: that some forms of technology
(uncontrolled digital and uncontrolled analog) have to be held back
and controlled in order for another (controlled digital) to flourish.49
Let's take this assertion apart.
First, the makers of this statement are proclaiming that digital
technologies are "better" than analog, and that for that reason the
content industry should be protected by rules that make it more likely
that the digital transition will take place. This is an argument for
imposition of the broadcast flag and adoption of the plug and play
proposal.
Second, this statement asserts that once the broadcast flag is in
place locking down digital outputs and digital machines, analog
understanding legal development and innovation in a general sense. I am not suggesting
for the moment that biologists will be able to tell policymakers what sort of intellectual
property legal regime would better fit human nature. Others may wish to undertake this
task.
49. MPAA ARDG slides, supra n. 38.
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outputs and analog machines should not be subject to different,
looser rules because, again, digital is the better technology and the
natural transition to that technology will be held back if people
continue to use analog devices. This is an argument for closing the
analog hole.
More generally, the content industry is using selectively the
notion of "survival of the fittest" to support its claim that a controlled
digital future would be better for us all and thus nothing should be
left to chance. In their minds, control over adequately secure
machines in addition to both digital and analog outputs essential steps
for the digital transition to occur both in the television world and in
the broader content community. They are saying, in effect, that the
consumer electronics and information technology companies should
innovate "according to the rules."5
By making these arguments, the movie studios are aligning
themselves with a view of evolution as forwarding "progress." The
notion that progress results from evolution was discarded by
biologists years ago, because traits or strategies that are successful for
a given population at one time may not work at all at another time.
Evolution is contingent, contextual, and filled with chance. Any
organism's success depends on the behavior of its contemporaries.
Evolution is not necessarily progress.
50. A requirement that other industries innovate "according to the rules" is a
strongly-held view of some elements of the content industry. In a public copyright debate
held at the New York Bar Association on May 5, 2003, Chuck Sims of Proskauer Rose (a
lawyer who has represented a wide variety of content owners) made the following
statement (paraphrased): "All creativity has to live within certain boundaries; the fact that
sonneteers live within parameters doesn't mean that their First Amendment rights have
been violated."
51. If we think of law as evolving, an intellectual approach often identified with
Oliver Wendell Holmes, we also understand that law does not necessarily progress. As
Donald Elliott notes in discussing the study of legal evolution, "For Wigmore, the true
study of legal evolution does not simply identify and universalize abstract patterns of legal
change: it must relate changes in the law to the local environmental conditions which
cause them. Nor does he believe that evolution in the law implies progress in a normative
sense. Rather, legal evolution means only that the law continually adapts to changes in the
environment." Elliott, supra n. 43, at 49; see also, e.g., Wigmore, Planetary Theory of the
Law's Evolution, in 3 A. Kocourek & J. Wigmore, at 532. "The evolution of law, which we
seek to discover, does not imply progress, either morally or otherwise, but merely
movement;.., but always including the cause with the effect." Id. Owen Jones has noted,
"Individual traits may be measured against their alternatives, which may provide
advantage, no advantage, or disadvantage, and may thus be measured as 'good' or 'bad.'
The evolutionary process responds to no such measurement, since the 'process' is
universal and cannot be compared to anything." Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy
and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory Framework for Trait-Selection Technologies, 19
Am. J. L. & Med. 187, 211 (1993).
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The same "progress" worldview advanced during an ARDG
meeting in favor of a controlled, regulated digital future has been
used selectively by many policymakers over time. 19th and 20th
century Social Darwinists argued that social policy should be
designed to allow the weak and unfit to fail. 2
Similarly, Sarah Cleveland has noted that "pseudo-scientific
theories of racial superiority have been used to justify the exclusion of
other peoples from democratic governance." These theories use
Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man and Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics, in which Darwin's work was transformed into a doctrine of
"survival of the fittest," to justify WASP superiority. 3 Andrew
Carnegie called on Darwinian evolutionary theories to justify
industrial inequities,54 while eugenicists like Francis Galton used
evolutionary science to support the view that governmental
regulation was necessary to prevent the genetic spread of inferior
races. " -These Social Darwinists did not keep the worlds of the
descriptive "is" and the normative "ought" separate, thus committing
the "Naturalistic Fallacy" by arguing that what "is" is what "ought" to
52. Turn-of-the 20th century policymakers used Darwin's theory of evolution in
order to make "the plunder of America [by corporations for their own financial
advantage] sound like divine right," by promoting as "the natural order of things, the
notion that progress resulted from the elimination of the weak." Any who opposed the
oligarchy were smeared as disturbers of the peace, socialists, anarchists, or worse, and
government was used only to forward money-making ends. Bill Moyers, This is Your
Story-The Progressive Story of America. Pass It On, speech to the Take Back America
<http://www.ourfuture.org/projects/nationalconference/2003/index.cfm> (Jun. 4, 2003).
53. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev.
1 (2002). Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871); Herbert Spencer, Social Statics
(1892); Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology, in Synthetic Philosophy 444 (1866).
54. Cleveland cites Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. Am. Rev. 653 (1889), reprinted
in A Documentary History of the United States 172-79 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 12th ed.
1965) (arguing that competition insures survival of the fittest, even in the industrial
context).
55. See Daniel Kevles, Annals of Eugenics: A Secular Faith, The New Yorker 5 (Oct.
8, 1984) (cited in Cleveland, supra n. 53, at 259). Cleveland notes that the term "eugenics"
was coined in 1883 by Charles Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, who sought to use
Darwinian science to improve human stock "by giving the more suitable races or strains of
blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable." Id. at 51. Galton's
positive eugenics, which encouraged reproduction of the elite, quickly devolved into
negative eugenics, which suggested that undesirables' reproduction be limited; ultimately,
genocide was the result. Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice: Caught between The Exorcist
and a Clockwork Orange, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 715, 724 (2002). After a long silence based on
revulsion against Nazi eugenics, "Social Darwinism" surfaced again in Richard J.
Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in
American Life (The Free Press 1994).
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be.56 As Fred Bosselman puts it, "The survival of the fittest has
historically been used by those who have survived to suggest that they
should have survived because they and their ancestors were the
fittest."57
Social Darwinists also focused sharply on resource scarcity,
arguing that in the face of a competition for scarce resources, no
government regulation made sense and, in fact, the interference of
the state would only slow down human evolution.58 Herbert Spencer
trumpeted the belief that "every person may expect nature to take its
course free from unreasonable private or state interference" and that
legal rights "were the products of evolutionary development from
economic necessity."59 Insofar as the content industry is using the
language of evolution and "progress" to support their quest for
regulation in a context in which scarcity is not an issue,' they have
taken a bizarre new path: without rules, they are saying, appropriate
evolution cannot occur.
Any focus on "evolution" as a justification for the flag and hole
proposals is troubling. "Natural selection" does not necessarily
promote "progress," and "survival of the fittest" should not require
governmental assistance. This is true particularly when the assistance
is directed at keeping unapproved consumer electronics equipment
from reaching the marketplace and keeping PCs from participating in
home networks that include cable input.
56. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the
Disruption of Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2072, 2087 (2000) (book review).
57. Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law,
15 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 247, 312 (1996). According to E. Donald Elliott, "The phrase 'the
survival of the fittest,' which does not come from Darwin but Herbert Spencer, has
probably created more misunderstanding than any other phrase in science. The core of the
problem with this phrase is the implication of the term 'fittest.' In biology, it is very rare
that there is only one unique solution that will survive.... There is a very broad range of
characteristics that can survive and exist within the population." E. Donald Elliott, Law
and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 St. Louis L.J. 595, 599 (1997) (citations omitted).
58. Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 645,
654 (1985).
59. Id. at 669 and 645 n. 3.
60. See generally Ex. B to the Cable/CE MOU (Compliance Rules), supra n. 28,
regarding the scarcity argument. Because there are now so many forms of electronic
entertainment, the DTV stream will be just one stream among many. The absence of
scarcity militates against applying special rules to broadcast, including rules designed to
ensure the survival of broadcast.
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B. The Role of Chance
In addition to assuming that "progress" stems from natural
selection, the content industry's survival of the fittest argument
proceeds from the assumption that static elements of systems are
chosen for success, plucked from a list in order to dominate the
environment. This assumption, however, misses the key role of
chance in evolution.
Any interesting system that is far from equilibrium6" (like
innovation, the economy, or the host of machines that might touch
digital content) can adjust to its environment in several different ways
at the same moment. We know that at a certain critical constraint
level (when enough real or metaphorical heat has been applied to the
system), a given system will become organized and characterized by
correlations across great distance. This organization is analogous to
natural selection. In contrast to the determinism of this phase change
(we know that organization will happen), we do not know which
particular choice will be selected. Simultaneously stable stationary
states can coexist under exactly the same experimental conditions.
Only chance, in the form of the particular ripple in the system that
was present at the time the selection took place, will decide whether a
given element within the system has characteristic A or B.62
Indeed, all systems (chemical, physical, and perhaps even
political) are characterized by an amazing interaction between chance
and constraint. Fluctuations arising from random motions are
analogous to changes (or new machines or technologies), and for any
bifurcation event to occur most interestingly choices need to be
present.
But not all possible choices need to be present. The complexity
of natural objects (or of innovation) should be at a "sweet spot"
somewhere between "perfectly predictable" and "completely
61. Systems at equilibrium will all have the same temperature (like a body of water)
and an observer inside the system will not be able to tell where he is-he will have no way
to measure space or time. If there are perturbations in this system, they will die out
quickly, and the behavior will eventually be as simple as at equilibrium. By removing the
system from equilibrium further and further, through an increase in some constraint (like
density or heat), experimenters see at some critical level of the constraint that matter in
the system begins to perform a bulk movement. Nicolis, supra n. 46, at 316.
61. Id. at 341.
62. The mechanism by which this choice is made is called "bifurcation." At the
crucial moment of transition between one state and another, the system performs this
bifurcation, and no one knows beforehand what the outcome will be. Chance will decide,
through the effect of fluctuations and the presence of multiple attractors. Id.
2003]
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random." Having completely predictable evolution may well put any
population at great risk.63
Consider the ant. Ants as individuals have highly chancy
behavior patters, even though as colonies they act quite coherently.
Some randomness is an adaptive value in the organization of ant
society.
If two food sources are presented to an ant colony, and that
colony as a whole is not very good at assembling ants around a food
source, a large number of ants will fail to be "recruited" around the
first source that is found and will wander off. Those wandering ants,
who have lost the trail because of "errors," will quickly find the
second source of food. Then, the colony as a whole will act: if the two
food sources are the same quality, it will focus all of its attention on
the first source until it is gone, and then it will eat the second-
without a break in its rate of food collection. If the second food
source is better (because of its concentration of glucose), it will eat
the second source, but will not completely ignore the first one. Some
level of randomness allows the colony to switch between these two
modes of behavior, by increasing the possibility of finding the second
source of food. The colony can then focus its efforts on the most
rewarding resource, while promoting the work to find and use
resources which will be fully exploited later. Indeed, experiments
show that, where there is more than one source of food, there is an
"optimal" value of error that defines this level of randomness. Had
the colony been perfectly good at gathering the ants around the first
source of food (perfectly deterministic and predictable), it never
would have found the second. Had the colony been perfectly random,
it never would have found the first source of food. '
What we look for in the evolution of languages, art, music,
innovation, and law is a "process capable of producing with high
probability a complex, information-rich . . . sequence of states.,
65
Such a process will be neither completely random nor completely
predictable. Mutation in innovation (or law) is whatever process
provides an environment that is hospitable to this complex,
information-rich sequence.
63. "The extent to which an organism can evolve is relative to the ability of its genes
or combinations of genes to adapt to environmental change (referred to as 'evolutionary
plasticity'). As a result, the natural selective preference of the evolutionary process should,
over the long term, lead an organism to retain those genes with greater, rather than lesser,
plasticity." Id. at 313-14.
64. This story is told in Nicolis, supra n. 61, at 318.
65. Id. at 341.
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Notwithstanding what Hollywood has been telling Congress and
the FCC, the key threat to innovation posed by the digital age may
not be piracy of copyrighted works. A more serious threat to this
complex adaptive system may be the actual or attempted control over
chance. 6 Complete randomness is meaningless, but some randomness
is necessary. Without retaining some helpful level of chance, we run
the risk of failing to find new sources of food or creating new, as-yet-
unimagined machines that could assist us in understanding and
displaying digital content.
IV. What Happens Next?
The Hollings-like approaches taken in the broadcast flag and
analog hole contexts, if successful, may have the unintended (or
intended) consequences of (1) keeping new otherwise-lawful
creatures (or new machines) from appearing and (2) keeping a
particular creature (the studios' business model) from becoming
extinct. If we assume that the studios will persuade the FCC, the
Congress, and the international community to see the world their
way, as a place in which a secure digital future is possible and desired,
we will be living in a world in which technology has permanently
trumped law.
A. Keeping New Creatures From Appearing
Both the broadcast flag and analog hole proposals are focused on
ensuring that no device (or software) capable of displaying, storing, or
converting digital content that is not "subject to the rules" will be sold
to consumers in the U.S. This means that every device will have to
adhere to the broadcast flag rules: incorporate approved copy
protection technology; encrypt flagged content; allow transmission of
flagged content only over approved connections to other broadcast-
flag-compliant devices; be sufficiently untamperable so that no
hobbyist can change the device's settings; and comply with whatever
additional license requirements are created by the proprietors of
approved copy protection technologies (including requirements that
licensees' machines not interoperate with any unapproved devices).
66. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Genome and the Law: Should Increased Genetic
Knowledge Change the Law?, 25 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 62 (2001) (arguing that
"governmental reinforcement of prevailing scientific orthodoxy and regulatory
impediments to the development of useful technologies" is a greater danger than new
genetic technologies).
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This is a breathtakingly broad set of goals, and it is important to
understand the implications of the content industry's plan. First, the
proposed broadcast flag/analog hole efforts are not limited to
preventing massive online redistribution of works to the public. The
MPAA/5C flag proposal, for example, states that the goal of the
regulation is: "Protection against unauthorized redistribution,
including internet redistribution, of protected content.,67 This means
that any redistribution, to any machine (including machines within
consumers' homes) will have to be authorized. 8 Any machine not in
compliance with the flag system, i.e., a system built to recognize and
adhere to the flag rules, will not be an authorized machine. Machines
designed for use within consumers' homes that are not authorized will
be unable to store, manipulate, display, or transmit flagged materials.
Thus, consumers will have to pay for the hardware, software and
license fees needed to protect content when the flag is present (or
could be present). They will also be subject to the inevitable
frustrations of not being able to use products they purchased legally,
when the technology does not work properly with DTV content. For
example, "a cable system recently turned on a content control bit
(similar to the flag descriptor), and consumers with new D-VHS
recorders suddenly "found that they could not record any programs
from the cable system."69 In the broadcast flag world, once a
consumer receives a television program on a flag-compliant device, he
or she will not be able to store or play that program on any non-
compliant legacy device.
Second, consumer electronic/information technology product
development may become subject to a variety of "gatekeeping"
mechanisms. All technology touching digital television content will
have to use Table A copy protection technologies approved by
others-in the interim, the FCC, but later, likely the video content
industry.70 As discussed above, certain proprietary technologies
67. Supra n. 13 (emphasis added).
68. Although the major broadcast owners and their studio owners have been saying
from the outset of the flag debate that their narrow goal is to prevent redistribution to the
public of their high-value HDTV works over the internet, the language of the proposed
rule covers all digital broadcast content (not just HDTV and high-value content) and all
unauthorized distribution (not just to the public at large over the internet). Id. This means
that transmissions over the internet of any broadcast content from a home to an office
would be barred unless explicitly authorized.
69. Craig Birkmaier, Retransmission Control, Broadcast Engineering <http://
broadcastengineering.com/ar/broadcasting-retransmission-control/> (Dec. 1, 2002).
70. In its November 2003 Order, the FCC initiated a Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to seek additional comment on the post-interim approval process for
approved content protection technologies. Order at 26.
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(known collectively as the "5C suite") have been pre-selected by the
content industry as "approved technologies" that every "compliant"
device will have to include. Once the 5C suite is on Table A, there
will be very few incentives for manufacturers of other content
protection technologies to have their products added to Table A. The
5C suite (which covers both storage and transmission) will
interoperate only with other 5C technologies, and once locked in to
the 5C circle consumers will not want to purchase non-interoperable
equipment.
If the studios are successful in getting their version of Table A
approval past the FCC, even those manufacturers who feel they have
sufficient monetary incentives to try for Table A admission will have
a hard time getting there. Under the original MPAA/5C Proposal, a
technology could be added to Table A only by (i) being used or
approved by three major studios; (ii) being used or approved by three
major television broadcast groups (of which at least two must be
major studios); (iii) being licensed by ten major device manufacturers
and used or approved by two major studios; or (iv) being found "at
least as effective at protecting [content] against unauthorized
redistribution (including unauthorized internet redistribution) as is
any one of the technologies then listed on Table A."
The first three of these routes to Table A listing would have
allowed self-interested industry members to make decisions about
new proposed technologies. Even the "as effective as" proposal
created a risk that future innovators would not diverge from
approaches that were similar to those taken by the 5C suite of
technologies.' Although the FCC has (for the interim, at least) taken
the studios out of the gatekeeping role, the paths to approval still
appear highly subjective."
71. The FCC recognized this risk in the Order, stating:
[W]e are concerned with one industry segment exercising a significant degree of
control over decisions regarding the approval and use of content protection and
recording technologies in DTV-related equipment. Nor are our concerns
alleviated by the "at least as effective" alternative, because such a test is limited
by what has already been approved under other alternatives and thus amounts to
an indirect form of control.
Order at 26.
72. See Order at 27 (FCC will examine factors including "level of security, scope of
redistribution, means of authentication, upgradability, renewability, interoperability, and
ability to revoke compromised devices," as well as the licensing terms associated with the
proposed technology.) Although the FCC has labeled these factors "functional criteria,"
the absence of quantifiable milestones makes that label suspect.
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For example, if someone develops a method (Technology 6Y)
for securely e-mailing content to a member of a pre-existing home
network (and erasing the original copy), how will the FCC decide if
6Y method is "as effective as" the 5C suite of technologies (including
the licenses that accompany these technologies)? The 5C suite
would not allow such e-mailing to take place. Similarly, what if
someone develops Technology 6Z, which allows 15-second clips of
content to be taken and e-mailed to friends? Again, how would
anyone decide whether such a technology was "as effective as" the 5C
suite, which does not allow such uses. By requiring new technologies
to compare themselves to already-approved technologies, relative
criteria tether future innovators to the technologies and techniques of
the past. Any technology that does not do what the 5C suite of
technologies does, does less than the 5C suite of technologies, or does
what it does differently, will be an apple in the face of FCC's oranges.
The CE and IT industries in the U.S. were concerned that the
Table A process proposed by MPAA/5C would have allowed self-
interested studio gatekeepers to apply subjective standards in
withholding approval of new products. The high-tech industries have
suggested that neutral, functional criteria to which manufacturers
could self-certify would be better than the Table A standards that
have been proposed by MPAA/5C. But it would be even better, they
suggest, to have no technology mandates at all in this area.
Had the VCR been invented after the flag rules went into effect,
it would not have been allowed to be marketed. VCRs neither protect
against the unauthorized copying of content nor secure content from
onward transmission, including transmission over the internet. They
do the opposite: VCRs allow consumers to copy broadcasts and share
them with family and friends. Indeed, at the time the current VCR
entered the consumer market, Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti told the House Judiciary
committee that "the growing and dangerous intrusion of this new
technology" threatened his entire industry's "economic vitality and
future security."73
73. As it turns out, VCR rental income (revenue drawn from an earlier "big idea")
has been an enormous boon to the movie industry. U.S. consumers spent roughly $8.7
billion on video sales and rentals (mostly movies) in mid-2002, and nearly $10.2 billion on
DVD rentals and purchases during the first half of 2003. Video Business, 2002 & 2003
Midyear Report <http://www.videobusiness.com> (accessed Oct. 3, 2003). Most new
technology developments touching high-value content have prompted resistance in the
courts and Congress-the player piano, cable TV, television, the VCR, and the DVD are
examples that come to mind. For the first four, compulsory licenses were enacted. See
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Implementation of the flag and plug-and-play schemes will
clearly have deleterious effects on innovation because of the simple
fact that designs of otherwise lawful consumer electronics devices and
information technology products will be dependent on approval by a
U.S. agency. The chilling effect of the flag discussions has already
changed the course of product development in the U.S. Similarly,
"closing the analog hole" (if such a thing is even possible) will have
enormous effects on innovation, as every device accomplishing an
analog-digital conversion will need to incorporate approved
technology and be sufficiently non-tamperable to be considered
"robust."
The special case of the general purpose computer provides a
clear example of the effect on innovation and the course of product
development that the flag/hole schemes and the plug and play
proposal may have.74 The open-platform personal computer is a
symbol of American innovation. Prompted by the extraordinary
progress that has been made in speeding up processing and
compressing storage enabled by personal computers, new products,
services, and communications patterns have rapidly emerged. Indeed,
the "end-to-end" principle of the internet, which has brought so much
change to our lives, mirrors the openness of the personal computer.
Just as internet standards have purposely not been optimized for any
particular application (thus encouraging explosive development
work), the design of computers should not be constrained. Otherwise,
we risk preventing the emergence of new big ideas.75 Yet the current
proposals for mandating particular technological protection
mechanisms involve setting constraints on the design of all digital
devices (or, in the case of the cable plug and play proposal, not
allowing computers to participate at all). We have observed years of
litigation over whether private control over innovation in the
personal computer market should be permitted through
anticompetitive practices in the operating system market. Mandating
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 27-29
(1996).
74. Work that I did during 2003 for Elliot Maxwell in connection with his production
of a white paper for the Digital Connections Council of the Committee on Economic
Development relates to the concepts in this section, and I am particularly grateful for his
discussions with me about these issues.
75. See Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the
Internet: The End to End Arguments vs. The Brave New World, ACM Transactions on
Internet Tech. <http://www.ana.lcs.mit.edu/anaweb/PDF/Rethinking_2001.pdf> (Aug.
2001).
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particular design constraints for the personal computer so as to
protect digital content seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
If the MPAA is successful in achieving its broadcast flag and
analog hole goals, it will have ensured that the variability and
fluctuations necessary for evolution to occur in consumer electronics
and information technology products that are capable of
manipulating DTV content (as in any other complex system) do not
exist.76 This effort will keep new creatures (such as new machines,
new innovations, and new communications methods) from coming
into being.
B. Keeping Your Own Creature From Becoming Extinct
The oft-repeated statement of the MPAA is that if the flag and
hole schemes are not implemented, broadcast television "as we know
it" will cease to exist." By this they mean, presumably, that shows
beloved by Americans will cease to be available for free. But why
should broadcast television be singled out for special protection
against its environment?
Many Americans have a special fondness for the television
programs of their youth. The movie industry has a strong growth rate
and a positive trade balance, and deserves attention as a producer of
jobs for Americans as well as a projector of the American character
76. The analog hole scheme, for example, if successful, will dictate that all future
innovation in this area will strike a "ceiling" of whatever rules are required in the
broadcast flag scheme. The role for analog outputs will be to support legacy equipment, in
the eyes of the MPAA. This is a major change from the status quo that has given us
innovations like the VCR, where analog outputs not only supported legacy devices, but
were generally available to support innovative products not yet imagined.
77. This is not the first time the broadcast industry has made this claim. See Joel
Brinkley, Defining Vision: How Broadcasters Lured the Government into Inciting a
Revolution in Television 19, 209, 347, 352, 362 (Harcourt Brace 1997), listing other
occasions on which the industry has claimed that broadcast television "as we know it" is
threatened.
78. Broadcast television, of course, is not really "free" because consumers buy the
products advertised on the shows. "Although few would argue that the profusion of new
media technology has reached the point at which broadcast television can be eliminated
entirely, the FCC's 'free' television mantra nevertheless shows signs of being more myth
than reality. Although viewers pay no fee to receive programming over broadcast
television stations, they must pay for the equipment itself-a television and antenna.
Advertising finances the cost of programming, thus creating 'free' television programming
but raising the cost of all products and services advertised on television. Although harder
to compute in dollar impact, social costs such as decreased attendance at community
functions and decreased membership in fraternal organizations arguably lead to reduced
societal productivity and involvement." Richard L. Weber, Note, Riding on a Diamond in
the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1795, 1832 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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around the world. Despite the recent slump, however, activity in the
consumer electronics market directly or indirectly impacts ten percent
of U.S. economic activity (GDP)-producing nearly $950 billion in
commerce yearly.7 9 Revenues for consumer electronics products are
expected to total a record $99.5 billion in 2003, marking a 3.5 percent
increase over 2002.' The information technology industry (computer
hardware, software, and services) was the engine of economic growth
in the 1990s. While IT-producing industries represent only 7 percent
of all U.S. businesses, they accounted for roughly 28 percent of
overall real economic growth between 1996-2000. IT's share of GDP
rose from 3.2 percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent at the peak in 2000, and
still accounts for 4.2 percent.82 These numbers overshadow the
revenues of the movie and video industry over the same period.83
While it is important to ensure the proper functioning of the
copyright system, it is fair to ask whether shifting encryption and
design costs to the information technology industry, and constraining
this industry's ability to innovate, makes sense.
Attempts to control bits and force the production of lower
capability devices, in the face of technology trends that continue to
improve the ability of these devices to record, store, manipulate, and
transmit digital information, also ignores the significant economic
activity entailed by consumers' participation in digital content. Much
consumer activity in this arena is legal. Billions of dollars are spent
annually by consumers for internet access, and this number is
increasing daily as broadband penetration continues to grow. The
growth in the number of devices (particularly portable devices) that
allow users access to content has been dramatic. Six million portable
79. Consumer Electronics Association, supplementary comments, In the Matter of
Application for Approval of Agreement by the International Air Transport Association,
OST-2003-14480
<http://www.ce.org/shared-files/recentactions/100CEA%20supplementary%20comments
.pdf> (May 29, 2003).
80. Consumer Electronics Association prediction, 2003 U.S. Sales of Consumer
Electronics to Hit New Record, Kissing $100 Billion, Says CEA (Home Toys News
Release) <http://www.hometoys.com/releases/an03/cea_01.htm> (accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
81. Information Technology Association of America, The U.S. Information
Technology Industry: A Brief Overview <http://www.itaa.org/news/gendoc.cfm?
DocID=120> (accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
82. Steve Hamm et al, Tech Comes Out Swinging, Business Week 62
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_25/b3838603.htm> (June 23, 2003).
83. Motion picture and video industry revenues were estimated at $49.6 billion in
1998, growing to $57.2 billion in 2001. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001 Service Annual
Survey: Information Sector Services, Table 3.0.1 <http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/
sas51.html> (accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
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digital media players were shipped in 2001, up 50 percent from the
year 2000.8'
As a legal matter, protecting broadcast television has also been
sharply questioned. The original scarcity arguments that provided a
rationale for regulating broadcast television have lost persuasiveness
over time, as innumerable means of reaching the public now exist."
Now that scarcity in the' broadcasting market is no more severe than
in any other communications arena, there is no justification for
Congress to apply any different rules to communications technology
beyond those to which all businesses are subject, such as competition
and labor laws.' One bit is very much like another.
Natural selection involves removing "unsuccessful" gene
combinations (combinations that have not adapted successfully to a
particular environment) from a population. Vacuum tubes are no
longer being manufactured, because their place has been taken by
transistors. Similarly, broadcast television's role in American culture
and the American economy may have been overtaken by other forms
of digital information.' More people are spending more time in front
of television screens, but the screens are not showing them broadcast
television. Instead, people are watching internet programming of
various kinds, as well as cable and satellite programming for which
they pay subscription fees. The idea of protecting "free,"
unencrypted, over the air broadcasting by crippling all devices that
are capable of receiving it (including devices that are traditionally
thought of as open platforms) does not make much sense." Indeed,
84. Raymond James & Associates, Investment Opportunities in Digital Media
<http://170.12.99.3/researchpdf/iDigO210O3fullrpt.pdf> 48 (Feb. 10, 2002).
85. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969) (upholding
"fairness doctrine" in part because of the physical scarcity of spectrum).
86. See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 93-94 (1996) (under property-based view of the First
Amendment, "the way to protect material property rights essential to the operation of the
press was to ensure that only rules of the kind that were applied to other business
enterprises could be applied to the press"; questioning decision in Turner Broadcasting v.
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), for failing to adopt property-based approach), id. at 110-114.
87. Nielsen's February 2003 ratings sweeps found one million fewer U.S. households
watching prime time television versus the same period in 2002, and CommerceNet
recently reported that North American online audience had doubled in the past 18
months. "Overall, internet users watched less television in 2002 than 2001; 11.2 hours per
week in 2002, compared to 12.3 hours in 2001." UCLA Center for Communication Policy,
The UCLA Internet Report-"Surveying the Digital Future" <http://www.ccp.ucla.
edu/pdf/UCLA-internet-Report-Year-Three.pdf> (accessed Aug. 11, 2003).
88. Theoretically, DTV movies and shows could be protected from piracy by
encrypting the digital broadcast before transmission ("encryption at the source").
Microsoft has argued to the FCC that the "[c]urrent proposal fails to protect content
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from the consumers' point of view the content will be encrypted: it
does not make a difference to the consumer whether the encryption
was accomplished at the broadcast tower or inside their own machine.
The MPAA is seeking not only to protect broadcast television
"as we know it," but also to protect the studios' particular business
model. This business model depends on controlled re-release of
content through various windows in carefully-delineated regions of
the world. This business model is based on historical control over
distribution of hard copies of works.
When content was physically distributed in the form of objects
that humans could handle (such as books and music stored on
physical media), rights holders could assert greater control over
distribution of rights and allocation of their sticks inside the bundle of
intellectual property rights both geographically and temporally.
During this era, for example, early release of a book in England
would not necessarily mean that many copies of that object would
appear in the U.S.-or, at least, not quickly. The physical difficulty
and expense of copying and shipping books militated against simple
or sweeping piracy, while the costs of such piracy were modest
enough that book publishers could continue to operate without
feeling threatened.
Now, in the digital era, the friction and cost involved in copying
and distributing content has greatly lessened. Peer-to-peer filesharing,
email, and web hosting services make it possible for individuals to
make their files available to the world. Because the internet allows
worldwide, inexpensive, and apparently instantaneous copying of
digital materials, high-investment content owners are frightened. The
video content world has responded to this fear by asserting that they
need legal protection that will allow them to replicate in the digital
world the friction found in the analog world. Indeed, the MPAA even
effectively" because "[clontent encrypted at the source is more secure." Microsoft ex
parte filing in the broadcast flag proceeding at 5 (Aug. 1, 2003). There are political issues
embedded here, however. The continued availability of "free" over-the-air television is
almost an article of faith at the FCC, even though there is no regulatory requirement of
non-encryption. See Order, supra n. 82. See, e.g., Comment of FCC Commissioner Gloria
Tristani in January 2001: "I am committed to preserving consumer access to free, over-the-
air television," .... "A substantial percentage of American households still rely on free,
over-the-air broadcasting for their local news and information." Jay Wrolstad, Wireless
NewsFactor, U.S. Won't Aid Wireless Channel Clearing, <http://www.wirelessnewsfactor.
com/perl/story/6966.html> (Jan. 24, 2001). Again, however, between 65 percent and 85
percent of American homes receive television over cable or satellite systems, not using
"rabbit ear" antennae. See Microsoft August 8, 2003 ex parte communication and
Comments of ATI Technologies, Dell Computer Corporation, Hewlett-Packard
Company, Intel Corporation, Microsoft Corporation and NEC Corporation, supra n. 29.
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speaks of the broadcast flag and analog hole efforts as creating
"speed bumps" that slow down the ease of reproduction and
transmission of their content in the online world.
Of course, this physical friction still exists in the digital world, for
the practical reason that it is now prohibitively time-consuming for
consumers to transmit digital video files online.89 This situation is
likely to remain for the next three or four years.9  Some
commentators have argued that the existence of this digital last-mile
friction dictates that the FCC does not need to act quickly.9"
Predictably, the content industry has responded that they are only
being prudent, by planning ahead for regulatory action so as to avoid
the manufacture of legacy (read: currently legal) devices that do not
adhere to the flag rules.'
The studios, as far as anyone can tell, are not aggressively
pursuing online content business models.93 Instead, they are working
89. A VCR-quality hour of standard (analog) television would require one to four
hours to download on a standard home broadband connection; an hour of high definition
digital television would take about fourteen hours to download. Ed Felten, Comments of
Public Knowledge, supra n. 23.
90. MPAA President and CEO Jack Valenti testified during September 2003 before
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations that the problem of video downloading is "three or four years away." Jack
Valenti, President and CEO, MPAA, Testimony, Privacy & Piracy: the Paradox of Illegal
File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment
Industry, Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (beginning at 1:22:20) <http://govaffairs.senate.gov/audio-video/
093003subvideo.rm> (Sept. 30, 2003).
91. Bifurcation comments of IT coalition, filed ex parte on Oct. 2, 2003; Letter from
Consumers' Union and Public Knowledge, supra n. 23.
92. Ex parte letter MPAA to FCC, Oct. 22, 2003.
93. Led by Sony, the studios (Warner Bros., Paramount, MGM, Universal, and
Disney) have opened up an online movie-download site called MovieLink. The site is not
yet a success, and The New York Times has noted "Movielink stand[s] out primarily for
[its] puny selection, poor video quality and overly rigid copy protection.... It boggles the
mind that these services don't exploit the potential of the internet. Any number of
improvements could make them more attractive than other video outlets. Online movie
stores could offer tens of thousands of movies, dwarfing the selection of video stores.
Digital rentals could last two weeks, not 24 hours, without costing the companies a penny
more. And there should be a choice of download speeds; people willing to wait longer for
superior quality should be allowed to. It is executives, not technology, who keep these
services from greater success." David Pogue, The New York Times, Film Rentals,
Downloaded To Your PCs, <http://hodder.org/nytimes/FilmRentals
DownloadedPC.htm>. (May 15, 2003); see also News.com, Movielink, Disney ink film
download pact <http://news.com.com/2100-1026-5053552.html> (July 24, 2003).
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at many levels (international agreements,94 treaties,95 federal96 and
state' law) to make the online world adapt to them.
94. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is the formal name given to an
expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to every country in
Central America, South America and the Caribbean, except Cuba. Negotiations began
after the completion of NAFTA in 1994 and are to be completed by the end of 2004, to be
implemented in 2005. FTAA, Draft Agreement-Chapter on Intellectual Property Rights
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa2002/tnc-w-133-11ofl2-eng.pdf> (Nov. 1,
2002). Article 21 of the draft FTAA agreement incorporates prohibitions consistent with
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) which implements in U.S. law
the circumvention provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty. However, the exceptions to the circumvention prohibitions that are
found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(c)-(k) are not included in the Draft. Additionally, Article 8 of
the draft requires each agreeing party to "grant the authors of literary and artistic works
the exclusive right to authorize any communication of their works to the public by wire or
wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works, such that
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them." This seems to be a broadcast flag/analog hole theme. See Supplemental Comments
of the American Library Association et al., Second Draft Consolidated Texts of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas Agreement <http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/
FTAASuppComments.pdf> (accessed Dec. 3, 2003) (arguing that the entire copyright
chapter of the draft agreement should be eliminated because the agreement "would serve
to unduly extend intellectual property rights beyond what is available under the laws of
the United States"). Concerns have been expressed concerning the criminal penalties
established in the treaty for file-sharing. E.g., IP Justice October 20, 2003 white paper.
<http://ipjustice.org/FTAA/IPJFTAAWhitePaper-r- 12.html> (accessed Nov. 9,
2003). The white paper concluded that "unless the draft intellectual property chapter is
substantially reformed or deleted in its entirety, the treaty will grant even greater control
to major intellectual property holders to chill freedom of expression, prevent competition,
restrict consumer rights, and stifle innovation."Id. The US has already agreed to bilateral
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Singapore that include similar
provisions-and the MPAA has had a great deal of influence on these agreements. Dugie
Standeford, Washington Internet Daily, Trade Pacts Could Broaden IP Law and Harm
Poorer Economies, <http://hilltop.bradley.edu/-bbrown99/MM450%2OSite/
Current.html> (April 15, 2003).
95. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) met in Geneva from June 23 to 27, 2003. At the
urging of MPAA members, the committee considered scheduling a diplomatic conference
with respect to a draft Broadcast Treaty that would grant more exclusive rights (and thus
greater legal control) to broadcasters. WIPO Update, Geneva, WIPO Member States
Make Progress in Shoring Up Protection for Broadcasting Organizations
<http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/index.html> (June 30, 2003).
96. On the U.S. federal level, an RIAA lawyer, Russell Frackman, recently publicly
claimed that the Copyright Act required installation of blocking or filtering tools in
technology products if necessary to prevent infringement. According to the Washington
Internet Daily, Mr. Frackman said the requirement was "'nothing new in the law,' but was
founded on the exclusive reproduction and distribution rights that Section 106" of the
Copyright Act accords copyright holders. Louis Trager, Washington Internet Daily,
Entertainment Lawyers: We Already Have Federal Tech Mandate (Aug. 12, 2003).
97. At the state level, attempts are being made to pass legislation that the MPAA
claims will update the DMCA to help combat digital piracy. The MPAA also claims that
new "criminal and civil penalties against internet pirates and hackers of communications
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By contrast to the video-content approach to the world, the
music industry is beginning to adapt to the digital environment by
creating new business models. Apple's iTunes Music Store, provides
music downloads from a large library of songs. The Music Store
processed as many downloads on its opening day in May 2003 as had
been collectively requested from the other competing download
services over a six-month period (more than 200,000) and has since
processed 500,000 downloads a week, for a total of 10 million
downloads as of September 2003."8 The reasons for the Music Store's
popularity are many. Rather than streaming music, it offers all the
songs available for download from the big-five record labels for $.99
each and is very easy to use. Users can save downloaded tracks on
multiple devices (and, through taking several steps can translate these
files into MP3 formats), and can copy music onto their own CDs,
which allows time- and space-shifting.' Apple iTunes has just been
ported to the PC, so Windows users may now adopt this technology.
More forms of private music DRM are already arriving online, and
several will likely be successful in the marketplace.
The video content industry should be left to adapt to the changed
conditions of the online digital world, just as the audio content
industry has had to do. The video content industry's approach has
been, instead, to act as if their particular creature should be globally
protected from extinction by imposition of a monoculture of
code/law, a very unnatural request.
services" at the state level are "an essential tool to complement resource-limited activity at
the federal level." (MPAA one-pager, on file with the author). By including none of the
limitations set forth in the DMCA, the proposed state legislation strikes a very different
balance than that found in the DMCA, and may harm technology companies, universities,
libraries, and users. While styled as "theft of service" legislation, the broad and ambiguous
bills that have been proposed (and, in some cases, passed) would potentially subject
consumers and manufacturers to criminal penalties and fines for attaching devices (e.g.,
TiVos) to their broadband connection that have not been "approved" by the connectivity
provider. Additionally, such liability could be found based on an "intent to defraud"
standard-a subjective yardstick that would be subject to case-by-case interpretation and
expansion. Faced with potential liability under these laws, retailers may choose not to sell
legitimate products. As of the date of the drafting of this article, state "super-DMCA" bills
have been passed or are under consideration in Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia. See Public Knowledge, Super DMCAs <http://www.
publicknowledge.org/issues/super-dmcas.html> (accessed Oct. 6, 2003).
98. Apple press release, iTunes Music Store Sells Ten Millionth Song, PR Newswire
(Sep. 8, 2003).
99. The iTunes Music Store uses the Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format-a
form of DRM. Downloaded files can be played on up to three computers and can be
copied onto CDs. An album can be copied no more than ten times. See Apple, iTunes
<http://www.apple.com/itunes> (accessed Oct. 6, 2003).
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C. Trumping Copyright Law Through Technology
The content industry's suggestion in the broadcast flag/analog
hole contexts is that copyright law be instantiated in code (in content
protection software systems that all U.S. manufacturers will have to
include in any new device that touches particular digital content).
But, unlike choices made by programmers, here the choice of what
"code" to put in place will be made by the sovereign at the request of
a single industry, and refusal to use particular software will be a
violation of law. What relationship will the broadcast flag code have
to copyright law?
For their part, the supporters of the broadcast flag and analog
hole proposals assert that implementation of their plans would do no
more than ensure that copyright law is followed by users. They say,
for example, that if the broadcast flag scheme is passed into law
consumers will be allowed to make as many copies of DTV content as
they want within their home networks, and that only a very generous
reading of copyright law would allow this.' +
But this statement is misleading. In the 5C world, once flagged
content is recognized by a 5C compliant device, it cannot be
transmitted to (or played on or copied by) any noncompliant legacy
device. So, if 5C is an approved technology listed on Table A,
consumers will be able to copy content only on (or transmit content
only to) compliant devices. For many consumers, this may mean
substantial (and perhaps surprising) required upgrading of their home
networks, and it is not at all clear that copyright law would require
this. °'
More generally, the broadcast flag proposal will require users to
operate machines that automatically prevent all "unauthorized"
uses-even uses that are not necessarily infringements of copyright.
By contrast, copyright law is based on the grant of specifically-defined
rights to prevent (or remedy damage caused by) particular actions of
other people. The copyright holder can choose to enforce her rights
and obtain money damages or an injunction. The owner may also
choose not to enforce her rights, because a particular abuse is not
worth the investment. Many small infringements that have no
100. MPAA/5C Proposal, supra n. 13, at 6 n. 3 (Dec. 2002).
101. For example, if the flag rules are promulgated as suggested by MPAA/5C, no
existing DVD player will be able to play DVDs recorded on future "flag-compliant" DVD
recorders. There are now 45 million DVD players in consumers' hands. Edward W.
Felten, Prof. of Computer Science, Princeton University (Washington, D.C., Sept. 17,
2003) (Testimony before Sen. Com. Comm.).
particular economic consequences (or may even be good for the
copyright holder by increasing awareness of the work) get ignored.
And many individuals choose to use content in ways they believe to
be reasonable.
For example, the flag scheme leaves no place for so-called "first
sale" rights. In the old world of copyright, it is perfectly legal to sell or
give away your copy of a book. But in the new world of
technologically-enforced permissioning through the flag, which
entails only licenses, not sales, that use might not be authorized. In
the analog world, resale of objects that have been distributed is
generally legal. In the world of the flag, "everything not permitted by
the copyright holder is prohibited."'"
Similarly, neither the flag scheme nor any hole proposal takes
account of fair use rights. This may be an unfair criticism because it
would be impossible to program something as context-dependent as
fair use, which requires an after-the-fact review of the circumstances
under which a particular infringement took place. Fair use does not
lend itself to clear and precise rules; for example, it is not clear
whether sending an entire copy of a film or song to a friend over the
internet is a fair use or not. Any coded description of what a
reasonable use of particular content is would be very likely to bar
future uses that might (in the context of a different time) be
considered fair. But the answer of the content industry to the effect
that "home copying is allowed," so no fair use concerns could possibly
exist, and no online transmission of their content could possibly be
fair, is insufficient.' By fixing the MPAA's vision of copyright law in
102. The so-called "first sale" doctrine embodied in Section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act of 1976 provides that the copyright owner's right to control distribution of copies only
extends to the "first sale." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1976). In other words, the Copyright Act
grants to authors the exclusive right to distribute copies of their work, but limits that right
by distinguishing between ownership of a copyright (the bundle of exclusive rights) and
ownership of a copy (the tangible material in which a work is fixed), and by extinguishing
the copyright owner's distribution right after the first sale of each copy. This right is the
basis for standard practices such as used book markets, library lending, and exchanges of
copyrighted works between friends and family. This first sale doctrine has allowed the
creation of libraries that provide access to copyrighted works to people who might not
otherwise have such access. A library can buy a single copy of a work and then loan it to
dozens or hundreds of people, one at a time, and, because of the first sale doctrine, such
loans are not considered infringements of copyright. Although these loans might be seen
as making it impossible for the publisher to make additional sales, as all potential
purchasers are potential library patrons, we know that the creation of libraries did not kill
the publishing industry in this country. Both authors and publishers have benefited from a
broadly educated public.
103. In the recent Eldred decision, the Supreme Court recognized that copyrights were
not necessarily "categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment," but
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code, a body of code/law that does not map to current copyright law
will be produced that will not acknowledge first sale, fair use rights, or
the duration of copyright or the idea/expression dichotomy.,1" And
the path dependencies of code will ensure that code continues to
trump law.
V. The Role of Code/Law
Although the MPAA is humorously wrong to suggest that
evolution of a "better" form of content requires imposition of global
technical mandates, they may have hit on a key theoretical step that
deserves attention. We can assume that law is a complex system that
has the capacity to modify its own state through evolutionary
change 05 We know that code, as well as law, has regulatory effects."
As Lawrence Lessig has argued, software copyright protection
programs that make software difficult to steal are a form of regulation
created by programmers instead of legislators. 7 Further, Tim Wu has
held that as long as Congress did not "[alter] the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 221 (2003). Thus, any Congressional action that has the effect of substantially
narrowing the public domain and/or eliminating fair use (perhaps by mandating particular
DRM measures that made no allowance for fair use) might be subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.
104. Flagged material will include ideas that, once flagged, will not be free to spread in
unapproved ways. They will be free to be received inside a closed, approved circle within
the home network, but will not be available for transmission online. Information, unlike
energy, is not (usually) conserved; in the flag context, it will be.
105. Many scholars have asserted that law is a complex adaptive system, characterized
by unpredictability and sensitivity to initial conditions. David Post and Michael Eisen have
described law as a fractal "tree" that involves choices at ever-lower levels. David G. Post
& Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal
Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 545, 546 (2000) ("We believe, more specifically,
that legal arguments have a kind of fractal structure-recursively generated and possessed
of a branching, self-similar, treelike structure at all levels of the argumentation
hierarchy."). Fractals are jagged curves or surfaces that retain the same level of
jaggedness when viewed at any level of minuteness. Coastlines, for example, are fractal;
the big bays and inlets will have little bays and inlets of the same general pattern. See also
J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How To Clean
Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933
(1997); J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic? 87 Minn. L. Rev. 885
(2003). J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45
Duke L. J. 849, 893-926 (1996) (using complexity theory to develop a general behavioral
model of legal system).
106. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 6 (1999);
Lawrence Lessig, Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501
(1999); Wagner, The Case Against Software, supra n. 2 ("The idea that code has regulatory
effects similar to law is firmly cemented into the consciousness of cyberscholars.").
107. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra n. 106, at 89 (1999).
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reminded us, "The prominent effects of computer code have made it
difficult to ignore the fact that code can be used to produce regulatory
effects similar to laws."' 8 We are learning that code and law are
complementary, and that lawmakers need to take seriously their
obligation to "preempt" code (or contractual agreements about code)
that do not fit social norms." But how does all of this code versus law
talk fit in to a coherent approach to code and law (taken together) as
an evolutionary ecosystem? And what relationship does this
ecosystem have to fostering innovation?
We need to gaze through a biological lens when looking at
regulation by code/law. Biology teaches us that preserving the
diversity of the gene pool of any complex adaptive system is
extraordinarily important. Monocultures do not do well in the battle
for survival, as the example of the food-seeking ant colony reveals.1 '
Diversity of the gene pool, by contrast, leads to a wider field on which
selection can operate. Systems that are as complex and interesting as
possible, without falling over the cliff into chaos, do best because they
are resilient and adaptable. Selection in such interesting systems has
more choices on which to operate. We need to think hard about what
kind of legal stance (implemented in code and law) would favor this
"sweet spot" of gene pool diversity. Diversity, in and of itself, is a
state to be wished for."'
108. Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 679, 680-81 (2003).
109. See Wagner, supra n. 2.
110. The monoculture of the Microsoft operating system has also been demonstrated
to be weak and open to attack. See Dan Geer et al., CyberInsecurity: The Cost of
Monopoly: How the Dominance of Microsoft's Products Poses a Risk to Security
<http://www.ccianet.org/papers/cyberinsecurity.pdf> (accessed Dec. 3, 2003). The massive
power outages experienced in the northeast portion of the US and parts of Canada on
August 14, 2003 will give rise to many thoughts about networks: "The lesson of this loss
[i.e., the power outages] is that networks aren't machines. We cannot control networks the
way we control machines. We must decentralize our control, distribute intelligence and
allow the network to learn and adapt. We will find someone to blame and throw some
bums out of office. We will serve ourselves well if, at the same time, we add to our ability
to trust innovation." Paul Philp, The Long Harvest, The Center Cannot Hold
<www.longharvest.com/archives/000138.html> (Aug. 15, 2003).
111. Justin Hughes has recently raised this idea in the form of a question: "[W]e have
reached a point where we treat preservation of cultural diversity in the same paradigm as
preservation of biodiversity. But one rarely hears the same concern for diversity in law.
"Multiculturalism" has legions of advocates and defenders, but "multilegalism"-if there
were such a word in English-would not make a very good battle cry. Imagine going to a
university campus and trying to hold a rally to defend the arcane, highly localized customs,
practices, regulations, and procedures of the world's lawyers and bureaucrats." Justin
Hughes, Political Economies of Harmonization: Database Protection and Information
Patents, Paris Draft (on file with author). This article is indeed a cry for "multilegalism"-
paying attention to the diversity of legal systems, and not forcing harmonization where the
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Although Polk Wagner has argued that because software is
inflexible and unaccountable we need more law and less software,' I
disagree with this premise. Both law and code establish the bases on
which they will change in the future-code, like law, can change-and
both need to be looked at in terms of their effect on mutation,
change, and overall diversity.
A. The Sweet Spot for Law
Whether we understand "law" to be either social patterns that
are labeled "law," per Robert Cover,"3 or a complex social institution,
per H.L.A. Hart,"4 we do not think of law as a regime of its own. Law
is not something that exists in the abstract, in a fixed state, and is
handed down to citizens from above. Law cannot be, we believe,
separated from the constituencies that are affected by law's statutes,
court decisions, and other expressions. Law is an emergent
phenomenon that contains rules by which these constituencies can
express themselves and change the rules. Law does not enforce a
particular worldview coming from just one of these constituencies. In
its most enlightened form, it is a platform that does not favor
particular regimes or rulesets. Without a social agreement to the
contrary, law should not cut across the protocol stack, making certain
applications (or rulesets) more difficult to use."' Law should facilitate
local populace does not wish it, is a form of legal stewardship that will allow for
appropriately structured experimentation.
112. See Wagner, supra n. 2.
113. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 179 (1985).
114. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 1 (1st ed., Claerndon Press 1961).
115. "Telecommunications and computer networking experts have long conceived of
networks and their associated computers as exhibiting a variety of well-defined 'layers.'
At the bottom of this 'stack' are the physical links between computers. Proceeding
'upward' through the stacks, there next come the protocols necessary to run the links, the
protocols necessary to connect the links together, the protocols necessary for two
computers at the ends of the links to communicate, the protocols necessary for the two
computers to open communications sessions, the protocols necessary for the computers to
associate data with the appropriate applications, and the protocols necessary for the
computer to execute the application associated with the data. TCP/IP is an effective
communications protocol for inter-networking because it confines its standardization to
the middle of these layers. Although it forces standardization on the network connection
protocols, it permits substaitial flexibility at lower levels of the protocol stack (permitting
various types of heterogeneous networks to connect) and at the higher levels of the
protocol stack (permitting various types of applications to network communication)."
James Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 225, 246-47 (2002) (footnotes omitted). "Cutting across the protocol stack" means
optimizing one level of the stack for one particular use at a higher level, or otherwise
privileging (or discriminating against) a higher-level application. One could re-
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the emergence of regimes with their own rulesets, like religions and
private groups, and keep the effects of each of these groups from
slopping over into the realm of other groups in ways that would cause
harm. 16 Law is supposed to tolerate the existence of multiple regimes,
and should not allow one sphere to mandate rules in another. Indeed,
arguably the only thing law can do wrong is to turn itself over to one
regime. When constituencies affected by particular laws feel that their
interests are not being taken into account, unrest and revolution is
more likely.
Thus, the sweet spot for law is one that allows for multiple sets of
rules to operate, as long as most people affected by them are willing
to go along."7 This spot, this balancing, looks similar to Jefferson's
view of Constitutional interpretation: reading the Constitution so as
to preserve the structural conditions that lead to competition among
jurisdictions.118 To bring the discussion down to a more concrete level,
the sweet spot for copyright law may not be a monoculture of
identical, harmonized policies worldwide that is the desired
expression of a single regime.1 9 It may be a better idea to provide for
conceptualize arguments concerning the separation of church and state as "whether or not
to cut across the protocol stack" to favor or disfavor religious activities. See, e.g., Robert
Justin Lipkin, Reconstructing the Public Square, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2025, 2032-78 (2003)
(asking what role religion should play in democratic debate).
116. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev.
311, 370-441 (2002) (overview of jurisdiction literature; asking why non-state actors should
be privileged in the consideration of jurisdictional questions).
117. Interjurisdictional diversity can help adjust the fit between the level of public
goods and the resources of a local population; it can also act as a check on inefficient
governmental actions. Jonathan Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 685, 689 (2002) (arguing that diverse jurisdictions can provide
information to other jurisdictions about the value of different legal rules). Professor Duffy
argues that "complete international harmonization of patent laws-particularly, the
institution of a single, integrated global patent system-would eliminate interjurisdictional
competition and substantially stifle innovation in patent law." Id. at 691.
118. See John 0. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of Decentralized Traditions and
Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 523, 535-536 (1999).
119. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469, 471 (2000) ("[I]t is a truism that
contemporary problems in copyright law demand international solutions.") There are, of
course, strong arguments in favor of harmonization, including lowering costs of
governance, lowering jurisdictional externalities, and preventing protectionism. Duffy,
supra n. 117, at 694-703. But tolerating legal diversity may permit legal innovation to occur
in ways that provide a better fit with the desires of a local citizenry: "[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). If we think of law as a complex adaptive system, it becomes clear
that diversity is a feature, not a bug.
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copyright law that varies by geography and industry, and allows easily
for change.
B. The Sweet Spot for Code
Similarly, code does not only constrain, like law, it sets rules for
itself about how it will be modified. Code is modular (or not), or open
source (or not). Code can be monopolistic if its use is so pervasive
that no real choices exist because the switching costs of moving away
from it are prohibitive. Code can encourage innovation by allowing
other applications to ride above it, or can make this impossible. Code
can allow mutation and variability, or it can stamp it out. Code can be
globally mandated, or it can be locally variable. Code comes in many
varieties, and some are "better" (in terms of encouraging diversity of
the gene pool) than others. The sweet spot for code may be a state
that allows follow-on innovation.121
C. The Code/Law Petri Dish and the Broadcast Flag
Now that we understand that law and code are complementary,
working to produce regulatory effects on individuals and providing
opportunities for paying attention to the variability of their gene
pools, it is a short step to argue that both law and code should provide
a rich background medium, a sort of petri dish, in which innovation
can take place. Both law and code should provide ecological niches,
120. Tailoring by industry may already be a fact of life in intellectual property law. See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1155 (2002) (arguing that while patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is
technology-specific in application). Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article, there is extensive literature on developing countries' requests that
intellectual property rights be tailored by geography. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and
the Access To Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. Intl. L.J. 481, 496-498 (2002) (noting that post-
TRIPS developing nations' battle over "TRIPS-plus" world intellectual property
standards is continuing).
121. It is not clear whether open source software is likely to be more successful than
proprietary software. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government
Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software: A Solution In Search of a Problem, 9
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 313, 314 (2003) (suggesting that "[tihere is no evidence
of any significant market failures in the provision of commercial software and no evidence
that the establishment of policy preferences in favor of open-source software on the part
of governments would increase consumer welfare"). But it is beyond question that
innovation in computer programs is mostly incremental and cumulative. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994). Thus, because
innovation stems from programs being "available" in some fashion, whether in source or
machine code form, it may be socially desirable to encourage availability. Openness to
modification is a particular form of availability.
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allowing marketplaces for applications and business models to
flourish.
Because both law and code establish the conditions under which
they will allow change, we should not necessarily privilege law over
code as a regulatory medium. But nor should we privilege code over
law. Fostering the optimal background medium of code/law for
innovation requires attention to the variability of the code/law gene
pool. Thus, for any particular thorny regulatory question, we have a
framework for questioning both the code and law involved: are they
appropriately supporting gene pool diversity? Or are they crowding
out change? It seems that there is a "sweet spot" stance towards
change (or variability) that both law and code should take.
We should not stand to one side with our law/policy hats on,
deciding whether to use Polk Wagner's "preemptive law" or any
particular combination of code or law at any given time. If we avoid
laws and codes that unduly stamp out change or innovation, then the
combination of code and law will evolve in a more interesting way.
Because evolution in complex systems depends on many populations
of genes that generate many different context-sensitive competitive
changes, there is little chance that a single central authoritarian
rulemaker (such as Congress or the FCC) will be able by itself to
make the right choices that produce an interesting mix of innovation
and protection. Public choice theory (read most simply) suggests that
these institutions will be incapable of coming to the right choices,
because they will be so strongly influenced by the most established
firms in the relevant industry sectors.'22 Whether or not humans (or
lobbying firms) act out of self interest (a proposition that seems easy
enough to accept on its face), it seems unlikely that centralized legal
institutions will have enough information to make adequate
innovation/protection tradeoffs-or tradeoffs that are as "interesting"
as those that might be found privately.23
Looking through the biology lens at the broadcast flag/plug and
play/analog hole debate reveals that adoption of the MPAA
proposals may poison the Post-Eisen fractal tree of copyright law, and
122. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 23-24 (Chicago 1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 43, 43 (1988) (stating that
"[p]ublic choice.., applies game theory and microeconomic analysis to the production of
law by legislatures, regulatory agencies and courts").
123. Centralized planning might not allow the complex, interacting decisions required
to deliver the goods in this context. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945).
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dampen innovation, by ensuring that evolution in both law and
products unapproved by the MPAA will not occur. With respect to its
desired legal regime, the MPAA is not taking anything for granted; it
will be extraordinarily difficult to dismantle the framework of
international treaties, federal decisions, and state laws that they are
building to ensure that no "unauthorized" devices touch their
content. And the view of copyright law held by the MPAA may not
map to current overall social pictures of that same body of law.
The technological approach the MPAA is suggesting in the
broadcast flag/analog hole proposals will instantiate a particular
vision of copyright law in mandatory code that will eventually be
globally pervasive. But law is supposed to be a social conversation
about collective values. Using code in this way to mandate one view
of copyright law may create path dependencies that will be very
difficult to change, cut off all social conversation about the course of
the law, and allow one regime to set rules for another without a social
agreement that such rules are necessary. This description states the
issue far too mildly. The MPAA is attempting to create an alternate,
technical walled garden that will seek to control the channel for
worldwide expressions-without a social consensus that such control
is appropriate.
Additionally, this mandatory code will not permit unauthorized
devices to manipulate flagged content-or even connect to authorized
home network devices. Thus, if global technical mandates are put into
effect implementing the broadcast flag requiring the plug and play
agreement and closing the analog hole, there is a real risk that
innovation will suffer. Diversity and change will be extraordinarily
difficult in consumer electronics and computing devices that touch
any digital content to which the studios attach value, because the
particular code that the MPAA seeks to mandate (use of the 5C suite
of technologies in all devices; requirement that all machines be
adequately secure) will be subject to change only if the content
industry agrees. This cannot be a desirable outcome.
There is nothing wrong with the content industry building gates
around its own content, which is what private DRM systems are. But
there is something wrong with the content industry using code/law to
force groups that do not want gates (and are otherwise acting in a
law-abiding fashion) to build them, particularly when the social
conversation for copyright law has not chosen to outlaw these
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otherwise legal devices. 124 Some manufacturers will not want their
devices to be crippled. Some manufacturers will believe that PCs
should remain open platforms. And many people will not want to buy
replacements for devices that are legal. Rather than grant unlimited
property rights, as the MPAA suggests, copyright law confers
particular rights limited in time and scope as circumscribed by statute.
It does so, ultimately, as a means of encouraging innovation for the
benefit of the public, not for the benefit of the copyright holder.
125
Both the code and the law under discussion in the broadcast
flag/plug and play/analog hole debates, and their combination as a
code/law petri dish, arguably fail the variability-of-the-gene-pool test.
By contrast, private DRM systems, like the iTunes system, will
provide the variability, choice, and fluctuations that are needed to
provide a fertile environment for innovation, while, in the meantime,
protecting content. Such systems may provide the "speed bump" that
MPAA says it is looking for, without the imposition of a global,
uniform solution that eliminates helpful variability. If this industry is
so concerned about losing control of their content, they should act to
protect it in ways that vary from movie to movie, from platform to
platform, and from moment to moment.26 Consumers will vote with
their feet, more and more slivers of choices for use of content will be
marketed, interoperable machines will continue to flourish as
consumers embrace them, and new ways of doing business will
emerge. The problem with mandating a particular content protection
technology and form of "approved" devices, across the globe, is that
it will narrow choices and frustrate many desirable evolutionary
processes for both innovation and code/law. That is not a tradeoff the
124. The MPAA and its member companies were worried enough to use litigation to
attempt to shut down the VCR industry in the 1970s. In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled
that manufacturers of VCRs had not acted as contributory infringers because VCRs are
capable of substantial non-infringing uses. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 442, 448-56 (1984). Here, similarly, most of the devices that will be required
to adhere to the flag/hole schemes will be capable of substantial non-infringing uses.
Rather than grant unlimited "property rights," as the MPAA suggests, copyright law
confers particular rights limited in time and scope as circumscribed by statute. It does so,
ultimately, as a means of encouraging innovation for the benefit of the public, not for the
benefit of the copyright holder. See 20th Century Music Corp. v. Aken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975).
125. See Id.
126. The Berkman Center and the Gartner Group recently released a report making
much the same recommendation. See GartnerG2 and The Berkman Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard Law School, Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/uploads/254/2003-05.pdf> (Aug. 2003) (flexible DRM
can accommodate consumers' needs while stopping rampant copying).
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content industry should be willing to endorse, however firmly-held its
belief in its "natural" prowess and importance.
As long as there is adequate choice in DRM systems (something
with which global competition law should be concerned), evolution of
devices and uses (and copyright law) can continue to flourish. In a
vibrantly competitive market,'27 software DRM systems are a useful
example of spontaneous order arising from the one-by-one decisions
of individuals and corporations without the central direction of
118government.
VI. Conclusion
The encouragement of innovation has long been a goal of
intellectual property law. Achieving this end is now complicated,
however, by the fact that law and code need to be looked at together
for their effects on innovation. The challenge for the next generation
of intellectual property policymakers is to design and implement rich
background code/law environments that allow for continued
evolution.
From this perspective, the MPAA's use of code/law to instantiate
their particular vision of copyright law (and assure a controlled,
"successful" digital future for their products) looks unattractive. A
heavy reliance on technology mandates makes sense if today's
decisionmakers are both capable of predicting which innovations are
likely to be most beneficial to the overall state of the world and
correct in striving to impose one regime's view of copyright law on
the future. But neither proposition makes sense, either as a
descriptive or normative matter. We have very weak powers to
predict the future, and the one thing we do know is that a more
127. I recognize that the assumption of a competitive market for DRM systems is an
optimistic one. It is of course possible that one firm will dominate media platforms
worldwide. It will be important to focus on the choices (and absence of choices) provided
by DRM systems generally, and on whether concentration in the market for such systems
has effectively removed choice altogether. Making these marketplaces visible will be a key
advance. See Susan P. Crawford, Who's In Charge of Who I Am? Identity and Law Online
(forthcoming)(actions of online intermediaries that affect identity should be visible).
128. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every
Continent": Towards A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex
Systems, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1055 (1998); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); see also Mark A.
Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1257, 1266-93
(1998) (noting problems with deferring to private norms, including that norms change over
time, internet norms may not be understood, norms do not adequately account for
externalities, and network effects make exclusionary norms undesirable).
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interesting future (in a biological sense) will be more resilient and
adaptable.
There is reason to suspect that instead of helping us to achieve
progress, the broadcast flag, plug and play, and analog hole proposals
now under discussion may cause legal and technical problems for
later innovators and consumers. Members of the present MPAA may
need to conclude that their conception of "survival of the fittest" will
have to change, because their creatures (i.e., their business plans) may
become extinct in light of the realities of the digital world. Instead,
the best strategy may well be to adopt private DRM solutions, with
the hope and expectation that new forms of content and new
privately-ordered marketplaces will arise. Hollywood may have to
abandon the illusion that they have some natural right to preservation
that can be implemented by restricting the choices of future
generations. Their successors in business will thank them. Loss of
resiliency and adaptability, both in innovation and in law-creation,
may not be worth trading away.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:603
